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Abstract 
 
While it is crucial for health plans to be protected against rising prescription drug 
costs, increasing cost sharing too much may mean that beneficiaries can not afford 
medication and non-compliance will become an issue.  
The objective of the study was to investigate the impact of pharmacy benefit 
design (PBD) changes on adherence to chronic medications and generic utilization. The 
study samples were three cohorts of commercially insured continuously enrolled patients 
with pharmacy claims of diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia between Oct. 1, 
2010 and Jun. 30, 2013.  Pre and post quasi-experimental design with control group was 
applied. To understand the impact comprehensively, PBD changes were examined in two 
steps: Step 1—Any changes in PBD; Step 2—Changes in cost sharing strategies only. 
Medication adherence was measured in proportion of days covered (PDC) by at least one 
medication of the target disease. PDC was also dichotomized as PDC>=80% and 
PDC<80%. Generic utilization was measured as the generic dispensing rate (GDR) for all 
medications took during the study period. 
Two statistical models were fit: General Linear Regression model for the 
continuously measured variables of PDC and GDR; and Logistic Regression for 
dichotomized PDC. Control variables were classified into three categories based on 
Andersen’s behavioral model: predisposing characteristics, enabling resources, and need 
factors, including beneficiaries’ demographic and socioeconomic information, 
medication conditions, and a proxy health risk estimate using Prospective Risk Score.  
The study sample was made up of 445,983 patients, of whom 45,850 were 
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identified with benefit changes and 400,133 were not. In the experimental group, 8,049 
beneficiaries had claims for diabetes, 36,712 beneficiaries had claims for hypertension, 
and 20,704 beneficiaries had claims for hyperlipidemia. The final control groups were 
randomly selected and were three times the number of those in the experimental group 
for each disease respectively. Mean pre-PDC is significantly higher than post-PDC, and 
mean pre-GDR is significantly lower than post-GDR for both groups. All models 
indicated no significant association between adherence and PBD changes. There were, 
however, significant associations between GDR and PBD changes in two cohorts. 
Beneficiaries with PBD changes had 0.007(p=0.0002) higher post-GDR in the diabetes 
cohort; beneficiaries with PBD changes had 0.004 (p<0.001) higher post-GDR in the 
hypertension cohort. Neither cost-sharing strategy had a significant impact on PDC 
within studied pharmacy benefit designs. Generic dispensing rate was also not significant 
associated with most of the cost sharing strategies except the copayment decrease of 
generics. For beneficiaries with a decrease in the amount of copayment for generic 
products, the mean post-GDR was 0.017 (p=0.0003) lower than beneficiaries without 
copayment changes in the diabetes cohort, although not significant in the hypertension 
and hyperlipidemia cohorts. 
Within the studied pharmacy benefit designs, design changes did not seem to 
affect medication adherence, but did positively affect generic drug utilization.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
 Annual prescription drug spending in the US is $374 billion in 2014 (Kaiser, 
May 2014). The increasing rate is 13% from 2013 to 2014. The large amount of 
prescription drug spending has been recognized as the most rapidly growing component 
of healthcare costs and has become the focus of policy attention(Huskamp, Deverka, 
Landrum, Epstein, & McGuigan, 2007; K. V. Nair, RJ., 2004). Pharmacy benefit 
management strategies were developed to contain greatly rising prescription drug 
spending without affecting health care quality.  
Pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs) are specialized managed care 
organizations (MCOs) focused specifically on management of prescription drug services. 
PBMs manage pharmaceutical benefits for managed care organizations, other medical 
providers or employers who interested in optimizing the clinical and economic 
performance of their pharmacy benefit. Their activities include benefit plan design, the 
creation and administration of retail and mail service networks, claims processing and 
managed prescription drug care services such as drug utilization review, formulary 
management, generic dispensing, prior authorization and disease and health management. 
A number of different measures have been used to report on these activities undertaken 
on behalf of PBMs clients, to ensure appropriate and cost-conscious used of prescription 
drugs.   
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Through the design of pharmacy benefit structures, PBMs have strongly 
influenced the delivery of pharmaceutical services. The cost per prescription and the 
number of prescriptions utilized are two central components to control total prescription 
drug costs. To achieve unit cost control and utilization management, pharmacy benefit 
design involves beneficiaries paying a copayment or coinsurance whenever they obtain 
prescriptions. The cost sharing mechanism was first introduced in mid-1980s to 
financially reward beneficiaries for using generic substitution and formulary drugs 
(Navarro, 2009). These cost sharing strategies not only reduce prescription cost paid by 
the health plan but also can affect prescription utilization. Most savings are derived from 
brand-to-generic conversion; some are attributed to reduce brand-name drug utilization. 
Encouraging the use of less costly substitutions, such as generic substitutions, can reduce 
pharmacy program costs by 10 percent to 15 percent (Navarro, 2009). Additionally, 
switches from non-preferred brands (usually a third tier) to preferred brands (usually a 
second tier) also contribute to the reduction in prescription drug spending. Switches arise 
when the copayment differential between these two tiers increases (Zhang et al., 2007).  
By spreading the financial risk to beneficiaries, pharmacy benefit design attempts 
to increase appropriate drug use and at the same time minimize pharmacy benefit costs to 
the extent possible (Crown et al., 2004). Previous researchers have consistently found 
that higher cost sharing is associated with reduced prescription drug spending (Fairman, 
Motheral, & Henderson, 2003; Gilman & Kautter, 2008; B. Motheral & Fairman, 2001; 
B. Motheral & Sheth, 2003). Specifically, Gilman and Kautter found that a 10% increase 
in copayment levels would be associated with a 1.3% reduction in gross drug spending. 
	   3	  
The efforts to control prescription utilization have significantly slowed the growth of 
overall prescription drug spending (CMS, accessed 2013 May 27).  
While it is crucial for health plans to be protected against rising prescription drug 
costs, increasing cost sharing too much may mean that beneficiaries can not afford 
medication and non-compliance will become an issue, especially for vulnerable 
populations. Heisler et al found cost-related medication restriction could be a mechanism 
for worse health outcomes among low-income and other vulnerable populations due to 
the reduction in medications(Heisler et al., 2004).  
Today, pharmacy benefit managers are still in a stage of finding the perfect 
balance between cost sharing and access to medications. Pharmacy benefit designs are 
modified or even completely changed during the process of pursuing this balance.  There 
are extensive variations in pharmacy benefit design changes. Many health plans increase 
prescription cost sharing across all tiers to lower the burden of prescription cost. Some 
health plans change from tiered copayment to coinsurance to share with beneficiaries the 
financial burden of brand-name drugs. In addition, the fast development of emergent high 
deductible health plans is making pharmacy benefit designs and their managements more 
complex. The changes that health plan managers make to pharmacy benefit designs as 
they struggle to manage plan expenditures brings forward the question “Do pharmacy 
benefit design changes affect patient utilization of, and adherence to, prescribed 
medications?”  
Raising the level of cost sharing has been demonstrated to be associated with non-
adherence and have adverse impacts on health care utilization among patients with 
chronic diseases in a 2005 review (Gibson, Ozminkowski, & Goetzel, 2005). The 
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copayment differentials in the reviewed studies are smaller than the copayment 
differentials in place today. As copayment differentials rise, non-adherence could be a 
critical issue. On the other hand, a 2011 study noted that switching to a high deductible 
health plan did not change medication availability or reduce usage of essential 
medications for chronic diseases(Reiss et al., 2011).  These relatively early studies and 
the inconsistency of findings between traditional cost-sharing strategies and the relatively 
new strategy of high deductible health plans suggests that new investigation of the impact 
of pharmacy benefit design changes on plan management and patient adherence to 
therapy should be reinvestigated.  
This study, involving varying levels of cost sharing structures, investigates 
whether cost sharing changes made in pharmacy benefit designs during a contract 
renewal period affect medication adherence among commercially insured, continuously 
enrolled patients with chronic diseases. Proportion of days covered (PDC) applied in the 
study is a commonly used measure of adherence(Choudhry et al., 2014).  
This study also estimates whether these changes increase the efficiency of 
formulary management. Generic dispensing rate (GDR) is one of the standard 
performance benchmarks monitored by PBMs to evaluate the effectiveness of pharmacy 
benefit design policies and procedures. Each one percent increase in GDR has been 
associated with a drop of 2.5 percent in gross pharmacy expenditures (Liberman & 
Roebuck, 2010). 
 
1.2 Objective and specific aims 
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 The overall objective of this study is to investigate the impact of pharmacy benefit 
design changes on medication adherence and generic drug utilization among 
commercially insured continuously enrolled patients with three common chronic 
diseases. For this study, pharmacy benefit design changes include only the combination 
changes in copayment, coinsurance with or without a minimum / maximum out-of-pocket 
per prescription claim, cumulative annual out-of-pocket maximum, annual deductible. 
Other elements of pharmacy benefit design, such as pharmacy network limitations and 
utilization management programs designed to ensure appropriate medication use, are not 
included in the study.  
Medication adherence is calculated using proportion of days covered (PDC). 
Generic drug utilization is analyzed using generic dispensing rate (GDR). Chronic 
diseases affect health and quality of life. It is also a major driver of health care costs 
because patients typically require lifelong medication therapy to induce and maintain 
remission. As the most common chronic disease, hypertension, diabetes, and 
hyperlipidemia are included in the study. 
In keeping with the overall objective, this study has two specific aims:  
 
Aim 1: To investigate the impact of pharmacy benefit design changes on adherence to 
prescription drugs for chronic diseases. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Changes in pharmacy benefit design (copayment; coinsurance 
with or without a minimum / maximum out-of-pocket per prescription claim; 
cumulative annual out-of-pocket maximum; annual deductible) are associated
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with changes in adherence to medication therapy for hypertension, diabetes, and 
hyperlipidemia (i.e. PDC) after controlling for other characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: As the amount of copayment and/or coinsurance increases, 
adherence to medication therapy for hypertension, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia 
(i.e. PDC) decreases after controlling for other characteristics.  
 
Aim 2: To investigate the impact of pharmacy benefit design changes on generic drug 
utilization for chronic diseases. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Changes in pharmacy benefit design (copayment; coinsurance 
with or without a minimum / maximum out-of-pocket per prescription claim; 
cumulative annual out-of-pocket maximum; annual deductible) are associated 
with changes in generic use of medication therapy for hypertension, diabetes, and 
hyperlipidemia (i.e. GDR) after controlling for other characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: As the amount of copayment and/or coinsurance increases, 
generic use of medication therapy for hypertension, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia 
(i.e. GDR) increases after controlling for other characteristics. 
 
1.3 Key terms and definitions  
 
Table 1 provides key terms and definitions used in this study.  
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Table 1 Study key terms and definitions 
Study key terms Definitions 
Pharmacy benefit 
management 
companies (PBMs) 
Organizations that manage pharmaceutical benefits for managed 
care organizations, other medical providers or employers who 
interested in optimizing the clinical and economic performance 
of their pharmacy benefit. PBM activities include some or all of 
the following:  benefit plan design, creation/administration of 
retail and mail service networks, claims processing and managed 
prescription drug care services such as drug utilization review, 
formulary management, generic dispensing, prior authorization 
and disease and health management. 
Prior authorization An administrative tool normally used by health plans or PBMs 
that requires prescribers to receive pre-approval for prescribing 
certain drugs to qualify those drugs for coverage under the terms 
of the pharmacy benefit plan. 
Utilization 
management 
Managing the use of medical services to ensure that a patient 
receives necessary, appropriate, high-quality care in a cost-
effective manner. As it applies to a pharmacy benefit, utilization 
management is any of a number of measures used to ensure 
appropriate medication utilization, including quantity 
limitations, step therapy, prior authorization and/or additional 
steps as deemed appropriate by the health plan’s Pharmacy and 
Therapeutics Committee. 
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Mandatory generic 
substitution 
A pharmacy benefit management tool that mandates the use of a 
generic equivalent drug product whenever one is available. 
Prescribers must justify the use of a brand-name product over 
the use of its generic equivalent.   
Pharmacy benefit 
design 
The coverage elements included in a health insurance policy 
under which prescription drugs and services will be paid by 
beneficiaries and health plan providers. A sound pharmacy 
benefit design balances patient care outcomes, costs, quality, risk 
management, and provision of the services that beneficiaries 
expect.  
Tiered copayment 
benefits 
A pharmacy benefit design that financially rewards patients for 
using generic and preferred drugs by requiring the patient to pay 
progressively higher copayments for preferred brand-name and 
non-preferred brand-name drugs. 
Prescription cost 
sharing 
Some portion of prescription drug cost paid by the insurer party, 
often being seen in the form of tier copayment, coinsurance, 
individual/family deductibles, and maximum individual/family 
out of pocket limits. 
Preferred brand 
drug 
A brand name drug for which the managed care organization 
(MCO) has determined to be a valuable, cost-effective treatment 
option. 
Non-preferred A brand name drug for which the managed care organization 
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brand drug (MCO) has determined offers less value and cost-effectiveness 
than preferred brand drugs. In multiple tiered pharmacy benefit 
plans, such drugs are typically placed on the third tier. 
Deductible A limit up to which the beneficiary pays the full cost of the drug. 
Copayments and coinsurance are in place after the deductible 
amount being reached. 
Copayment  A fixed amount of payment per prescription that the beneficiary 
pays, i.e. $10. 
Coinsurance  A percentage of the contracted price for the medication in 
quantity dispensed that the beneficiary pays, i.e. 10%. 
Out-of-pocket cost A limit that is set as a fixed dollars amount after which the 
insurer pays 100%.  It is the sum of the amount paid through 
deductible, copayment and coinsurance. Copayments and 
coinsurance are in place prior to the limit being reached. 
Full drug insurance The beneficiary dos not pay any out-of-pocket expenditure at the 
time the prescription is dispensed. 
Medication 
adherence 
Refill compliance or adequacy of medication coverage for the 
beneficiary.  
Proportion of days 
covered (PDC) 
The ratio of the number of “usable” days supplied from all refills 
to the total number of calendar days following (and including) 
medication initiation during a determined period of time (e.g., 12 
months).  
	   10	  
 
PDC threshold The level of PDC above which the medication has a reasonable 
likelihood of achieving most of the potential clinical benefit 
(80%for diabetes and cardiovascular drugs). 
Medication 
possession ratio 
(MPR) 
The sum of the days supply for all claims during a defined 
period of time (e.g., 12 months) divided by the number of days 
elapsed during the period.  
Generic utilization The number of generic prescription claims for the insurance plan 
beneficiary during a period of time (e.g., 1 months). 
Generic dispensing 
rate (GDR) or 
generic fill rate 
(GFR) 
The total number of retail generic prescription claims dispensed 
divided by the total number of retail prescription claims for the 
beneficiary during a determined period of time (e.g., 12 months). 
Prospective Risk 
Score 
The member’s predicted “health risk” (i.e. the likelihood of 
exceeding predefined cost thresholds) for the 12 months directly 
following the claims experience period. The process involves 
three phases: 1) National Drug Codes (NDCs) recorded on 
pharmacy claims are assigned to unique Drug Class Codes 
(DCCs); 2) Individual’s number of unique DCCs are mapped to 
105 initial Optum Symmetry Pharmacy Risk Groups (PRG) to 
combine DCCs of similar clinical and risk characteristics; 3) 
Further Pharmacy Risk Groups (153 total) reflected 
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comorbidities are defined based on member age and the 
combination of initial Pharmacy Risk Groups observed; 4) Array 
markers for each member to create a clinical risk profile; 5) The 
sum of the pre-determined weights assigned to these risk 
markers provides the overall risk scores for the individual.  
Optum Symmetry 
Pharmacy Risk 
Groups 
A pharmacy-based assessment that uses prescription data and 
proprietary classification systems to estimate a member’s future 
resource use and expenditure. See appendix 1 for a list of 
pharmacy risk groups. 
Generic Product 
Identifier (GPI) 
Medi-Span’s Generic Product Identifier (GPI) categorizes drug 
products by a hierarchical therapeutic classification scheme for 
use in computerized therapeutic drug monitoring applications 
(such as duplicate therapy and drug dosing), market research, 
and reporting applications.  
Drug formulary A continually updated list of medications and related products 
supported by current evidence-based medicine, judgment of 
physicians, pharmacists and other experts in the diagnosis, 
treatment of disease and preservation of health to encourage the 
use of the safe, effective and most affordable medications. 
Open formulary The payer generally provides coverage for all formulary and 
non-formulary drugs. The payers include the health plan, the 
employer, or PBMs acting on behalf of the health plan or 
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employer. 
Closed formulary The payer does not reimburse non-formulary drugs. Formulary 
exception policies allow patients and physicians reimbursement 
and access to non-formulary medications where medically 
appropriate. 
Treatment 
termination date 
The last observed fill date plus the number of days for which the 
medication was dispensed.   
 
1.4 Study design and limitations 
 
As proposed, this is a retrospective observational cohort study. The study used 
pharmacy claims data from a large pharmacy benefits management company located in 
Minnesota. To explore the hypotheses discussed above, logistic regression and 
generalized linear modeling were utilized.  
There are a number of major limitations. Firstly, limitations related to claims data 
must be acknowledged beforehand:  
(1) Coding errors or inaccurate entries may exist.  
(2) Pharmacy claims may not completely represent patients’ medication coverage.  
(3) Patients’ consumption compliance cannot be evaluated through claims data. 
Pharmacy claims represent the acquisition of a prescribed medication only. 
(4) The measurements of generic drug utilization and medication adherence may 
not be accurate because some sources of supply that are not recorded in 
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claims, such as out-of-plan use of pharmacy services and over-the-counter 
(OTC) medications.  
(5) Socioeconomic information was not provided in the claims data. Data related 
to income, educational level, and races/ethnicity were estimated from 2010 
census data by ZIP code of residence. 
Secondly, as this study is a quasi-experimental design observational study, it is 
subject to the concern regarding internal validity. Therefore, this study only examines the 
association, instead of causal relationship, between pharmacy benefit design changes and 
generic drug utilization and medication adherence.  
Thirdly, this study primary focuses on examining behaviors driven by the change 
of benefit design on cost sharing. Patients may choose to forgo a drug or change an 
established drug regimen for other reasons; among these are side effects, low curative 
effects, perceptions about the similarity of lower-tier substitutes and providers’ opinions 
of discontinuing or altering established drug therapies, and other changes in benefit 
designs. Above factors all provide some insights into the evaluation of generic drug 
utilization and medication adherence. However, data to measure these other possible 
reasons are not available.  
Various predisposing, enabling, and need factors used in the statistic analysis 
were limited. Variables such as belief constructs (patient perception), prescriber 
characteristics (specialty), and local area characteristics (region) were not incorporated 
due to limitations of the data source. The analysis might be subject to unobserved 
confounding. 
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Finally, since the data is restricted to populations from employer-sponsored, 
commercially insured health plans from 2011 to 2012, the results can not be generalized 
to other settings or years, such as Medicare, Medicaid, or other public plans.  
 
1.5 Significance of the study  
 
The intent of a pharmacy benefit plan is to encourage efficient use of prescription 
drugs, abate inefficient use, and avoid undermining health outcomes. The introduction of 
cost sharing structures intends to promote greater patient engagement. Even though a 
pharmacy benefit design helps to control prescription drug expenditures, it also causes 
concerns on the adverse effects of inadequate treatment in the process of medication use. 
The way that pharmacy benefit plans are structured and implemented can affect patient 
behavior and health outcomes. The type of cost sharing structures that is available to 
beneficiaries varies widely. It is important to find the right mixes of cost sharing 
characteristics to ensure positive plan management and patient care in today’s healthcare 
system. Cost sharing for chronic diseases matters more from a clinical and economic 
point of view.  
Compared to previous studies, this study was based on large samples using “real-
world” pharmacy claims data. “Real-word” data has higher validity to be generalized to 
real-world clinical practice than data from clinical trials, where individuals are monitored 
closely. The study also employed pre- and post-experimental design with control group, 
not commonly adopted in literatures studying benefit design changes.  
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The study examined both medication adherence (measured by PDC) and generic 
drug utilization (measured by GDR) for chronic diseases. PDC is the pharmacy quality 
alliance (PQA) recommended metric for estimation of medication adherence for patients 
using chronic medications. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Star 
Ratings is a plan ratings that indicates the quality of Medicare plans on a scale of 1 to 5 
stars with 5 stars being the highest rating. The overall star rating is determined through 
numerous performance measures across several domains of performance. PDC of chronic 
diseases is one measure for Star Ratings. Generic utilization is also an important 
performance measure of benefit plans. It is highly associated with prescription 
expenditures. Understanding the association between medication adherence and benefit 
design changes, generic utilization and benefit plan changes are important knowledge 
need. The results can provide guidance for PBMs and other MCOs to refine the structure 
of pharmacy benefits.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
  
Studies selected for the literature review were based on electronic searches of 
OVID Medline, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, and Google Scholar. Key words 
or phrases were pharmacy benefit, benefit design, utilization, adherence, compliance, 
generic fill rate, generic dispensing rate/ratio, deductible, copayment, coinsurance, tier 
formulary and cost sharing. Key words were searched in various combinations. 
Additional studies were identified from the reference lists of selected publications.  
Abstracts were reviewed for relevance to the study aims. Full articles regarding 
the impact of pharmacy benefit design on medication adherence or generic utilization 
were identified for further review and evaluation. Publications selected were published in 
English within the period 1990 to 2015. The populations studied were from the United 
States or Canada. Additional criteria included the underlying disease or condition (with 
an emphasis on diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia), pharmacy benefit plans 
(tiered copayment and coinsurance, deductible, maximum out-of-pocket limits), and 
study measures (PDC and GDR) used.   
To review the impact of pharmacy benefit design changes on medication 
adherence and generic unitization, this literature review covers three aspects: the 
elements of pharmacy benefit design, the impact of pharmacy benefit design on 
medication adherence, and the impact of pharmacy benefit design on generic utilization. 
 
2.1 Elements of pharmacy benefit design 
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Today in the US, more than 90% of covered workers have prescription drug 
coverage as part of their health insurances (Kaiser, May 2014). Almost all of them face 
the requirement to share drug costs through some form of prescription cost sharing. 
Prescription cost sharing is put into place to encourage consideration of prescription costs 
prior to the purchase of the medications by the beneficiaries(Choudhry et al., 2014). 
The essential structure of the pharmacy benefit design among US health care 
plans is the multi-tiered formulary. Multi-tiered formularies classify drugs into two or 
more tiers with different level of cost sharing based on safety, clinical effectiveness, 
acquisition cost, and the availability of comparable medications (Mullins, Palumbo, & 
Saba, 2007). The first-tier drugs are usually generics; the second-tier drugs are typically 
preferred brands; the third-tier drugs are generally non-preferred brands; the forth-tier 
drugs are life style drugs or specialty drugs. Cost sharing increases with each tier level 
(first tier has lowest copayment and fourth tier the highest). 
Most multi-tiered formularies refer to formulary-based medications; non-
formulary medications are usually placed at the highest cost sharing level. More than 
three out of four covered workers are in plans with three or more cost-sharing tiers for 
prescription drugs. For these workers copayments, rather than coinsurance, continue to be 
a more common form of cost sharing(Kaiser, May 2014). 
Multi-tiered formulary structures are categorized into several types including: flat-dollar 
tier (e.g., flat-dollar 3-tier, flat-dollar 2-tier), flat coinsurance, tiered coinsurance, and a mix of 
tiered copayment and coinsurance. Some designs also apply family/individual deductible amounts 
and family/individual maximum/minimum out of pocket limits other than tiered copayment and 
coinsurance. These represent various forms of cost sharing as discussed below.  
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2.1.1 Copayment structure  
 
There are wide variations in the design of multi-tiered formulary. The flat-dollar, 
two-tier plan is the simplest one. The formulary list (i.e. the drugs that have been 
approved for coverage by the insurer) is divided into two tiers—the first tier being the 
generic version of approved drugs, and the second tier being the brand name version of 
approved drugs. A copayment dollar value is assigned to each of the two tiers and is 
usually higher for the second tier. The copayment differentials between first and second 
tiers, however, generally not provide an adequate incentive for patients to use generic 
substitutions. Therefore, two-tier plans have been rapidly declining and being replaced by 
plans with more tiers.  
In a three-tier formulary, brand drugs are divided into preferred brands and non-
preferred brands (Frank, 2001). The three-tier formulary structure has been the most 
commonly used.  
In a four-tier formulary, brand drugs are usually further differentiated by higher 
cost sharing for specialty drugs and expensive biologics (Roebuck & Liberman, 2009). A 
growing number of specialty drugs have been introduced to the market (See Figure 1). 
The application of higher tier plans enables beneficiaries to have access to newer or more 
expensive drugs at a cost-sharing burden.  
In three or more tier plans, the average copayments for non-preferred drugs have 
increased significantly, while remaining constant for generic drugs. For covered 
beneficiaries in plans with three, four, or more tiers of cost sharing, the average 
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copayments are $11 for first-tier drugs, $31 for second-tier drugs, $53 for third-tier drugs, 
and $83 for fourth-tier drugs (see Table 2). For covered employees with two tiers of 
prescription cost sharing, the average copayments are $11 for generics and $30 for 
preferred drugs (see Table 3).  
 
 
*Source: Kaiser/HRET survey of employer-sponsored health benefits, 2000-2014. 
Figure 1 Distribution of covered workers facing difference cost sharing formulas for 
prescription drug benefits, 2000-2014 
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Table 2 Among covered workers with three, four, or more tiers of prescription cost 
sharing, average copayments and average coinsurance by drug type, 2000-2014 
 
*Source: Kaiser/HRET survey of employer-sponsored health benefits, 2000-2014. 
 
Table 3 Among covered workers with two tiers of prescription cost sharing, average 
copayments and average coinsurance, by drug type, 2000-2014. 
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*Source: Kaiser/HRET survey of employer-sponsored health benefits, 2000-2014. 
 
2.1.2 Coinsurance structure  
 
While multi-tiered, flat-fee copayment benefit designs have been widely 
employed among US health insurers, coinsurance benefit design is becoming increasing 
popular(Klepser, Huether, Handke, & Williams, 2007). However, copayments are still 
more common than coinsurance for beneficiaries in plans with two tiers (see Figure 2). 
Coinsurance structure (the amount of cost sharing that is incurred by the beneficiaries) is 
directly related to drug price—the more expensive the drug, the more of the cost the 
beneficiaries bear. Coinsurance stabilizes the cost-share mix between beneficiaries and 
insurers.  
To ensure beneficiaries against high dollar expenditures with expensive 
medications, some designs introduce a maximum beneficiary out-of-pocket limit per 
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prescription with the coinsurance benefit. If a specialty drug that might cost $1000, the 
maximum out-of-pocket limit might limit the financial burden to a maximum of $250 
rather than $300 with a coinsurance of 30%. Minimum coinsurance out-of-pocket limits 
per prescription can also be defined within the coinsurance structure, which sets the 
lowest amount of money that the beneficiary must pay per prescription. For generic 
drugs, 21% of beneficiaries have only a maximum dollar amount attached to the 
coinsurance rate, 10% have only a minimum dollar amount, 27% have both, and 42% 
have neither (Kaiser, May 2014). 
Coinsurance structure can also divide drugs into different tiers as copayment 
structure does. For covered beneficiaries in plans with three, four, or more tiers of cost 
sharing, the average coinsurance is 19% for first-tier drugs (generally generic drugs), 
24% for second-tier drugs, 37% for third-tier drugs, and 29% for a fourth-tier of specialty 
drugs (see Table 2). These estimates are all smaller than the estimated coinsurance rate in 
2012. The smaller percentage assigned to fourth-tier drugs (generally expensive specialty 
drugs) still results in high out-of-pocket expenditures that will exceed third-tier drugs at 
the higher coinsurance rate.   Ten percent of covered workers are in a plan that has two 
tiers for prescription drug cost sharing. The average coinsurance rate for the second tier is 
27%. 
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*Source: Kaiser/HRET survey of employer-sponsored health benefits, 2000-2014. 
Figure 2 Distributions of coinsurance structures for covered workers facing a 
coinsurance for prescription drugs, by drug tier, 2014 
 
2.1.3 Deductible and OOP costs 
 
Deductible is the fixed dollar amount paid by beneficiaries before insurance 
benefits pay out. Deductible amount usually refers to an individual limit but for some 
benefit plans, a family deductible limit may also be applied. In either case, the deductible 
amount must be reached within a contract year before other health insurance benefits are 
applied.   
OOP cost is a fixed dollar amount after which the insurer pays 100% of all 
incurred costs. It is the sum of the amount paid by the beneficiary through the deductible 
amount, copayment/coinsurance amount, and the cost for any services not covered by 
insurance, which are in place prior to the limit being reached. OOP costs include 
individual OOP costs and family OOP costs if they are specified. Once the individual 
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OOP cost amount is met, all other costs for that individual will be reimbursed. If a family 
OOP cost limit is part of the benefit plan, once it is met, the cost to all family members 
will be fully reimbursed thereafter.   
 
2.1.4 Other structures 
 
There are several other mechanisms to motivate patient behaviors other than cost 
sharing, including a defined physician provider network, a defined pharmacy provider 
network, a drug formulary, a mandatory generic substitution program, dispense-as-
written (DAW) financial penalty, maximum allowable benefit (MAB), mail delivery and 
so on(Roebuck & Liberman, 2009). MAB caps the total amount paid by insurers for 
prescription drugs either annually or lifetime. Mail delivery encourages beneficiaries to 
order prescriptions for chronic conditions by mail and receive a lower OOP cost per 
medication day supplied. 
 
2.2 Changes of pharmacy benefit management 
 
The essential pharmacy benefit design components have not changed significantly 
since they were introduced in the mid 1980s. However, the aggressiveness and 
effectiveness by which pharmacy benefits are managed has changed. As health insurers 
and self-insured employers attempt to reduce the financial burden associated with the 
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growing use of prescription drugs, beneficiaries are increasingly faced with higher cost 
sharing benefits at the time of their annual enrollment period.  
Plans can choose to remain with the same cost sharing structures but                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
make dollar amount changes to individual components. There can be increases or 
decreases in the copayment amount or coinsurance within formulary tiers, increases or 
decreases in deductible amount (individual or family), or increases or decreases OOP cost 
(individual or family) at contract renewal.  
Other component changes can also impact cost sharing. Typical changes include 
the transition from copayment to coinsurance, or from coinsurance to copayment, the 
transition from either single copayment or single coinsurance to a mix of copayment and 
coinsurance, and the transition from copayment to a high deductible plan. There can also 
be structural changes to the drug benefit such as changes to the formulary tiers. While 
today, benefit plans tend to change from a low number of tiers to a higher number of 
tiers.  
 
2.3 Medication adherence to chronic diseases 
 
The importance of medication adherence in the management of chronic diseases 
has been demonstrated by several research studies. Non-adherence can cause adverse 
impacts on health outcomes, such as a higher danger of readmission, which may results in 
more consumption of medical utilizations(Dunbar-Jacob & Mortimer-Stephens, 2001). In 
contrast, higher adherence to drug therapy is associated with lower costs and better health 
outcomes(Sokol, McGuigan, Verbrugge, & Epstein, 2005). Sokol et al found that 
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increased drug utilization for diabetes and hyperlipidemia could provide a net economic 
return when it was driven by improved adherence.  
In the process of recommending drug therapy, physicians prescribe the treatment 
regimen without necessarily having concern about drug costs or formulary coverage 
(Shrank et al., 2005).  Beneficiaries are left to inquire about lower cost substitutes under 
their prevailing insurance and make decisions about filling the prescription, switching to 
a lower cost drug, or abandoning the treatment based on their perceptions of affordability. 
Prescription drug coverage is, therefore, an important factor determining patient 
preference for drug therapy and adherence to the prescribed drug (D'Souza, Smith, 
Miller, Doyle, & Ariely, 2008). 
Additionally, adherence to medication is influenced by many other factors. 
Included among them are: satisfaction with the current prescription (effectiveness, 
experienced side effects), continued availability, provider’s opinion, the disease being 
treated, knowledge of and perceptions about lower-tier substitutes, geography, 
socioeconomic status, gender, and age. Age, sex, and socioeconomic status are frequently 
examined factors(Couto et al., 2014; Doshi, Zhu, Lee, Kimmel, & Volpp, 2009). Couto 
found younger age beneficiaries, lower income beneficiaries, and females were less 
adherent to chronic medications for hypertension, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia.  
To fully explain medication adherence, many more studies of varying quality 
have focused on insurance design factors such as copayment, coinsurance, deductible, 
and max OOP limits(Choudhry et al., 2014; Doshi et al., 2009; Gibson et al., 2005; 
Gibson et al., 2010; Goldman et al., 2004; Landsman, Yu, Liu, Teutsch, & Berger, 2005; 
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Mann et al., 2014; Pilote, Beck, Richard, & Eisenberg, 2002). The next section discusses 
these financial factors in more detail.  
 
2.4 Insurance design factors influent medication adherence  
2.4.1 Copayment and coinsurance 
 
The association between cost sharing and adherence is non-linear. Factors such as 
the absolute size of copayments in absolute terms, the size of the copayment changes, the 
time horizon examined, and assignment of drugs to tiers all have been identified in the 
literature as affecting the strength of association. Also, the impact of cost sharing on 
adherence appears to be different for new users and existing users; new users who lack 
experience with prescription drugs might be more sensitive to cost sharing 
changes(Goldman, Joyce, & Zheng, 2007; Solomon, Goldman, Joyce, & Escarce, 2009).  
After reviewing related literature published before 2013, Mann concluded that 
small cost sharing (up to 25% cost sharing) did not impact medication adherence 
significantly, while large cost sharing (i.e., 95% cost sharing) had a substantial impact 
(Mann et al., 2014). Landsman’s study predicted that doubling copayments in a typical 2-
tier plan was associated with significant reductions in use, especially among therapies for 
diabetes, but the impact on medication adherence appeared to be small (Landsman et al., 
2005). 
Some researchers have found that increased cost sharing or the addition of tiers 
(which would affect cost sharing) would reduce prescription use (Joyce, Escarce, 
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Solomon, & Goldman, 2002; B. Motheral & Fairman, 2001). Some studies have found an 
inverse association between copayment and medication adherence to drug therapy of 
chronic diseases(Atella & Kopinska, 2014; Gibson et al., 2005; Goldman et al., 2004; 
Lesen, Andersson Sundell, Carlsten, Mardby, & Jonsson, 2014; Simoens & Sinnaeve, 
2014). Zhang found that a 10-dollar greater cost share was associated with 31.9 percent 
greater odds of being non-persistent (PDC was used to measure persistence) among 
members newly initiating ACEI or ARB therapy(Zhang et al., 2007). Happe found that 
there was strong evidence of a negative correlation between formulary restrictions 
(including step therapy, cost sharing, prior authorization, preferred drug lists, and 
quantity limits) and medication adherence outcomes (Happe, Clark, Holliday, & Young, 
2014). Doshi and colleagues demonstrated that increasing copayment by $5 resulted in up 
to 40% lower adjusted odds of adherence in a high-risk group of US veterans(Doshi et 
al., 2009).  
Additionally, Choudhry found that value based insurance design plans (which 
have linked copay levels to the clinical value of the product or service) that provide more 
generous coverage (e.g., 100% coverage) were associated with higher rates of medication 
adherence (Choudhry et al., 2014). Other researchers have reported that greater OOP cost 
was associated with lower adherence(Aarnio et al., 2014; Suehs et al., 2014). To some 
extent, full reimbursement may be more cost-effective than copayment program when 
considering the impact of medication adherence.  
Some plans may have a hybrid design—fixed copayment design with a 
subsequent addition of coinsurance or switch completely from one design to the other. 
Scheneeweiss found a small decrease in adherence to statin when plans change from full 
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coverage to the mix design of cost sharing(Schneeweiss, Patrick, Maclure, Dormuth, & 
Glynn, 2007). Klepser studied plans that changed from 3-tier copayment to 4-tier 
coinsurance and found no significant reduction in overall drug utilization (Klepser et al., 
2007).  
 
2.4.2 Deductibles 
 
In a literature review, the use of deductible (up to $350 per year) did not have 
substantial association with medication adherence (Mann et al., 2014).  This study 
however referenced literature with lower deductible designs than exist today. In the 
current healthcare system, the deductible designs may go up to $10,000 or more in some 
high deductible health plans (see Table 15). The impact of high deductible design on 
medication adherence was uncertain. There may be a threshold effect of deductible 
amount; because the deductible may be too high to afford, beneficiaries may either not 
initiate or discontinue drug therapy before reaching the threshold.  
 
2.4.3 Maximum out-of-pocket limits  
 
The impact of maximum out-of-pocket expenditure on medication adherence is 
uncertain(Doshi et al., 2009; Pilote et al., 2002). Doshi found that US Veteran’s 
Administration beneficiaries without a maximum out-of-pocket expenditure had a slight 
decline in adherence compared to those with a maximum out-of-pocket expenditure 
	   30	  
($840 US per year). In a Canadian study, Pilote and his colleagues, however, found no 
apparent change in adherence when plans changed from copayment to coinsurance with 
varying levels of annual maximum out-of-pocket expenditure (ranging from $250 to $ 
750 CDN).  
 
2.5 Generic utilization of chronic drugs 
 
The use of generic drugs could result in significant cost saving(Duru et al., 2014).  
Increase the use of generics by 10% can reduce Medicare costs by about $1 billion 
annually("Zero copayment for generic statins could save billions," 2013). Facing the 
increasing financial burden of prescription drugs, generic substitution is an essential 
option to save cost, especially for chronic diseases (Goldman et al., 2004).  
Both supply-side and demand-side factors have impacts on generic utilization. 
Financial incentives for community pharmacy networks (high dispensing fees for 
generics) have been the dominant supply-side drivers, while aggressive benefit designs, 
step therapy, and prior authorization have been the dominant demand-side 
drivers(Liberman & Roebuck, 2010). The premise of cost sharing strategy of benefit 
design is that by shifting the burden of cost onto beneficiaries, they will be more 
judicious in consuming prescriptions. With the application of tiered cost sharing, 
beneficiaries may have preference of generics. 
The use of generic is an important cost sharing strategy. It has been defined with a 
measure, the generic dispensing rate (GDR), which is now considered an important 
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measure of formulary management efficiency. The generic dispensing rate is the 
proportion of all prescriptions filled as generic. PBMs generally report that a 1% increase 
in GDR will save 1% to 2% of total pharmacy expenditures(Roebuck & Liberman, 2009).  
Gibson’s review identified studies of three-tier plans and found that different 
levels of cost sharing structure impacted GDR variously (Gibson et al., 2005). Five out of 
seven studies reported an increase in GDR when cost sharing increases or generic-only 
policy applied, while the other two studies found no significant association between GDR 
and cost sharing changes. Specifically, Nair et al found an increase in GDR by 6-8% 
whether there were tier changes or not(K. V. Nair et al., 2003). Motheral and Henderson 
found an increase from $10 to $15 for brand copays was associated with an increase in 
GDR(B. R. Motheral & Henderson, 1999). Thomas et al found more aggressive cost-
sharing requirements combined with other management strategies were associated with 
an increase in GDR(Thomas, Wallack, Lee, & Ritter, 2002). Christian-Herman et al 
found a generic-only benefit was associated with an increase in GDR(Christian-Herman, 
Emons, & George, 2004). Kamal and Briesacher found two tier plans with generic and 
brand differentials of $10 was relative to higher GDR compared to flat-copayment 
plans(Kamal-Bahl & Briesacher, 2004). 
However, these studies cited did not specifically address the relationship between 
percentage changes in cost sharing and GDR. Gilman et al did examine copayment 
changes and found that a 10% increase in copayment was associated with a 0.7 
percentage points increase in GDR(Gilman & Kautter, 2007). Smaller copayment 
differentials provide fewer incentives for patients to switch to a formulary alternative. 
That is, with small increase in copayment, use of prescriptions was relatively inelastic 
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(Landsman et al., 2005). On the other hand, if the cost sharing change was too high, 
patients tended to discontinue the use of medications (Huskamp et al., 2007). 
Beneficiaries with higher generic cost sharing had lower generic use; larger cost 
sharing difference between brands and generics were significantly associated with greater 
generic use of chronic drugs(Roebuck & Liberman, 2009; Tang, Gellad, Men, & 
Donohue, 2014; Zimmerman, 2012). Higher brand cost sharing design appears to 
attenuate increases in drug spending by decreasing the consumption of brands and 
steering beneficiaries to generics. Also, reductions in cost sharing of generics would 
motivate beneficiaries to use generics(Clark et al., 2014; Lieberman, Polinski, Choudhry, 
Avorn, & Fischer, 2014). For example, low or zero copayment is the greatest influencer 
of generic statin utilization. 
Plan cost sharing changes usually go alone with tier changes. The findings of the 
impact of tier changes on generic use were inconsistent. A few studies found the 
association of more formulary tiers (>= 3 tiers) with increased generic utilization(Gilman 
& Kautter, 2008; Huskamp et al., 2003; Landon et al., 2007; Mager & Cox, 2007).  
Mager found 3-tier design had GDRs that were two percentage points higher than 2-tier 
structures. Gilman et al found GDRs were 4.3 percentage points higher for 3-tiers 
compared to 1-tier plans. It is expected to have a reduction in the use of brand name 
drugs as well as non-formulary drugs, and a raise in generic utilization.  Nair, however, 
found no significant difference in GDRs when plan changed from 2-tier to 3-tier, 
comparing to plans stay in the same tier design (K. V. Nair et al., 2003). Motheral et al 
also reported no significant change in GDRs following the implementation of an 
aggressive benefit change(B. Motheral & Fairman, 2001). 
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Other than cost sharing structure, factors such as brand loyalty also affect generic 
utilization. Gibson found that almost all of the studies demonstrated that a third tier 
resulted in a reduction in pharmacy utilization, but the price elasticity varied for different 
medication classes(Gibson et al., 2005). For example, beneficiaries are more loyal to 
therapy classes related to symptomatic diseases, and, therefore, less sensitive to patient 
cost sharing. Gender and disease status were also demonstrated to be associated with 
generic utilization(K. V. Nair et al., 2003). Nair et al found that the GDR for women 
were 6.2% greater than men. Beneficiaries with arthritics were more likely to use generic 
medications, while beneficiaries with diabetics and hypertensive were less likely to do so. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
The literature that has been summarized, points out that socio-demographic 
factors combined with the design of prescription drug insurance benefit can influence 
medication adherence and the efficiency with which prescription drugs are managed. 
Only a few studies utilize strong research designs like a pre-post intervention design with 
a comparator group. For the studies that do use a pre-post intervention design with a 
comparator group, the comparator group does not always represent a carefully matched 
control group nor is the statistical analysis rigorous. For example, in Nair’s study, both 
comparator and intervention groups experienced an increase in copayment amounts, 
which were not measured, during the study calendar year(K. V. Nair et al., 2003).  
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Motheral and Fairman’s study is one of the earliest efforts to examine the utility 
of benefit design in influencing prescription utilization (B. R. Motheral & Henderson, 
1999). However, the copayment differentials (from a $10 to $15 copayment for brand 
names) in that study and other studies about this topic are normally smaller than current 
cost sharing arrangements. As cost sharing continues to rise, beneficiaries may be more 
sensitive to the cost of prescription drugs. Hence, previous research may not be relevant 
when considering the impact of a more aggressive benefit design structure. Also, the 
types of plans that were examined in previous research are very limited. Few studies have 
examined the changes seen in larger cost sharing arrangements in a commercial insurance 
population.  
The study that is the subject of this dissertation focuses primarily on prescription 
drug benefits and the impact that changes to these benefits has on subsequent medication 
adherence and generic drug utilization. Chapter three presents the underlying conceptual 
framework for this research. 
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Chapter 3 Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework of this study is based on the economic theories of 
demand for health insurance and the Andersen’s behavioral model of health services 
utilization. The economic theories of demand are used to predict the relationship between 
benefit design changes and medication adherence, and to predict the relationship between 
benefit design changes and generic utilization. We use the Andersen’s behavioral model 
to order and array predictors. 
 
3.1 The economic theories of demand for health insurance  
 
Bernoulli originally proposed the theory of demand for health insurance in his 
seminar paper in 1738(Nyman, 2003). Bernoulli suggested that the insured was risk 
adverse and his/her demand for health insurance was due to the need of maximizing 
individual’s expected utility. Neumann and Morgenstern advanced the theory by 
developing a practical method for measuring utility as a function of income. In 1963, 
Arrow argued that government should intervene and expand health insurance coverage 
based on the conventional expected utility theory. Shortly after that, Pauly brought up the 
theory of moral hazard that was associated with health insurance. Moral hazard was 
defined as any change in behavior that was due to becoming insured. It represented a 
movement along the consumer’s demand curve.  
Pauly thought of moral hazard as a welfare loss to society.  Figure 3 illustrates 
Pauly’s argument (Nyman, 2003). D represents the demand for medical care (M). When 
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the customer is uninsured, the price of medical care equals to the marginal cost. The 
amount of medical care consumed is Mu. If the customers are insured with full coverage, 
the price becomes 0. The amount of medical care consumed raises to Mi. The amount of 
Mi-Mu is the additional medical care consumed by the customer because of being 
insured. Thus, the cost of moral hazard is the marginal price times the quantity, which 
equals to abMiMu; while the value of the moral hazard is the area under the demand 
curve, which equals to aMiMu. The moral hazard welfare loss is the cost minus the value, 
which equals to abMi.  Therefore, if the insurer raises the coinsurance rate from 0 to c, 
the customer’s price becomes cP. The movement along the demand curve reduces moral 
hazard by Mi-Mc. The welfare loss is reduced from abMi to acd.  
 
 
Figure 3 Moral hazard welfare loss. 
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Pauly’s article was the most influential article in the health economics literature 
and directed policies at containing health care costs. It prompted the policy of raising the 
level of cost sharing on demand-side and the policy of imposing managed care on supply-
side (Nyman, 2003). Feldstein’s study sustained Pauly’s view of moral hazard. Feldstein 
found that the welfare loss from moral hazard exceeded the gain from risk avoidance and 
suggested raising the coinsurance rate to 66%. The rate is a lot higher than current 
coinsurance rate applied in health insurance design. The result of RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment (HIE), the most costly and famous experiment, was also 
concordance with Pauly’s theory (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse et al., 1987). RAND 
HIE concluded that cost sharing contributed to a reduction of 31% health care 
expenditures without affecting health outcomes.  
Prescriptions are normal goods with positive income elasticity.  The economic 
theories applied in health care also fit in the pharmaceutical industry, where employers 
and insurers continue to use cost-sharing strategies. Following health economics theory, 
the demand for prescription drugs will decrease as the price increases (Folland, 
Goodman, & Stano, 2013). Economists assume that rational customers will consume an 
optimal amount of products subject to their income constraints. Based on this economic 
principle, raising the price will result in a reduction in consumption of higher costly 
products and increasing cheaper substitutions.  
Figure 4 shows the effect of cost sharing on beneficiary’s purchase 
decision(Nicholson, 2005). Beneficiary’s decision of continuing using drugs is assumed 
to be a rational trade-off between drugs and other goods. The isoquant curve U1 shows 
all the combinations of other goods Y and prescription drugs M that can produce U1 
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output. When the demand line Dp1, where the cost-sharing amount of prescription drugs 
is p1, tangent to the isoquant curve U1, the input combination of (M1, Y1) minimizes 
cost to get the same output. Suppose the prescription cost-sharing increase to p2 (p2>p1) 
and the prices of other goods stay the same, the new isoquant curve will change to U2 
(U1>U2). Thus, the new optimal combination becomes (M2, Y2) to maximum utility 
under budget constraint. An increase in the cost sharing of prescription drugs will lower 
beneficiary’s quantity demand.  
Two different effects come into play in the consequence of the movement 
between M1 and M2, when the patient cost sharing changes.  On one hand, to stay on the 
same isoquant curve U1, beneficiaries have to substitute other goods for prescription 
drugs, called the substitution effect. It causes a downward movement from M1 to Mb. On 
the other hand, income effect will induce a reduction in the beneficiary’s purchasing 
power. It causes a downward movement of indifference curve, which means the change 
from U1 to U2.  Mb-M2 is the income effect showed in the figure(Nicholson & Snyder, 
2012).  
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Figure 4 The effect of cost sharing on prescription drug consumption  
 
According to the above economic theories of demand, we can generally expect 
that:(1) In order to reduce moral hazard, beneficiaries are forced to face an increasing 
patient cost-sharing; (2) beneficiaries who face a higher cost-sharing will have a 
reduction in pharmacy utilization. Here we include the income effect and substitute effect 
to predict beneficiary’s pharmacy utilization. Beneficiary may substitute expensive brand 
drugs with cheaper generics. All the assumptions above consider the effects of other 
parties, such as physicians and pharmacists, are held equal across all customers.  
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Cost sharing strategies help limit the consumption of unnecessary drug therapy 
that may otherwise result from generous benefits. Today, patient cost sharing within 
pharmacy benefit design have risen considerably, especially for brand name drugs. The 
challenge is to identify the level of patient cost sharing so that patients will have 
sufficient access to prescription drugs without increasing welfare loss.  
 
3.2 Andersen’s behavioral model of health services utilization 
 
There is a set of determinants that are in traction with health behavior, including 
personal determinants, family determinants, social determinants, institutional and cultural 
determinants, disease groups, and structured communities.  
Andersen displayed and tested those factors in a study published in 1968. The 
original model ordered and arrayed three main predictors and two indicators of health 
care utilization, and built up the causal pathways between them(Gochman, 1997). The 
three predictors are predisposing characteristics, enabling resources, and need factor. 
They have been widely used to display complex causal models of health care-seeking 
behaviors (see Figure 5).  
Predisposing characteristics are factors that describe the propensity of individuals 
to seek care, which may exist before illness, including demographics (age and gender), 
social structure (education, occupation, ethnicity and social network), and health beliefs 
(attitudes, values, and knowledge about health and health services). Enabling resources 
describe the resources must be present for use to take place, including community (source 
of care, travel and waiting time) and personal resources (income and health insurance 
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benefits). Need factors represent either a subjective acknowledgement of need or 
professional judgment, which, therefore, is categorized into two components—perceived 
need (individual or provider judgments of the presence of illness) and evaluated needs 
(judgments of the severity of conditions)(Aday et al., 1993).  
 
 
Figure 5 The initial behavioral model of health service use(R. M. Andersen, 1995) 
 
The original Andersen model purported that health services utilization is 
dependent on individuals’ predisposition to use health services, their ability to access 
services and their need for health care. The model also suggested that need for care 
factors were the strongest predictors followed by enabling resources and predisposing 
characteristics. Each component was conceived as independent contribution to predict 
utilization. The model promoted the government to develop policy for equitable access 
(R. M. Andersen, 1995). This behavioral model was a concise yet comprehensive model 
generated from sociology, economic, psychology, and medical literatures. Critiques of 
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the model included the validity of measuring concepts, interactions of predictor variables, 
need for additional variables (Gochman, 1997).  
 A revised framework, named Andersen and Newman Utilization framework in the 
late 1970s, was more responsive to societal and policy changes as well as the increasing 
complexity of health care service delivery(R. Andersen & Newman, 1973). Shortly 
thereafter, Aday and Andersen Access Framework was developed specifically to evaluate 
the performance of governmental and private programs in enhancing health care 
access(Aday & Andersen, 1974).  
Both Andersen’s original and revised behavioral model of health services 
utilization has been adapted to address patients’ health behaviors, and to predict and 
explain their utilization of health service, including prescription drugs (Bhattacharya, 
Chatterjee, Carnahan, & Aparasu, 2011; Blalock et al., 2005; Kamble, Chen, Sherer, & 
Aparasu, 2008; Mehta, Nagar, & Aparasu, 2009; Smith, Boyd, & Kirking, 1999). It is 
normally used as conceptual framework and characterized by three distinct categories to 
predict factors associated with pharmacy utilization.   
The purpose of Andersen’s model is to discover conditions that either facilitate or 
impede utilization. In this study, we aim at determining whether the additional variables 
add additional prediction to medication adherence while adjusting for the three 
predictors. Meanwhile, the same factors within Andersen’s model are also hypothesized 
to be associated with the decision to use generic substitution when facing a higher cost 
sharing of prescription drugs.   
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Chapter 4 Methods 
   
This retrospective cohort study analyzed enrollment and pharmacy claims data 
maintained by a pharmacy benefit management (PBM) company. Supplements included 
public files (e.g., 2010 census data). This chapter introduces the data source, cohort 
design, and statistical models.  
 
4.1 Database and cohort design 
4.1.1 Database description  
 
The dataset used in this study was obtained from Prime Therapeutics, LLC. 
(Prime), a PBM company owned by 11 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans in Florida, 
Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Texas and Wyoming. Prime has benefit management responsibility for approximately 
14.7 million lives. All claims and eligibility files are maintained in a health insurance 
portability and accountability act (HIPPA) compliant secure data warehouse. The study 
documents were submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of 
Minnesota; approval was received on March 25, 2013 (see Appendix 2).  
This study utilized personal-level pharmacy claims data based on a unique patient 
identifier. All of the enrollees included in the database belonged to employer-sponsored 
health insurance plans. Pharmacy claims and eligibility data were extracted and 
aggregated at the patient-level to create a dataset of PBM clients during the period.  
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At the time of data extraction, the following exclusions were applied: 
 
(1) Persons lacking complete data enrolled in Medicaid, Medicare Part B, and 
Medicare Part D supplement; 
(2) Persons enrolled in Medicare Part D plans; 
(3) Persons enrolled in North Carolina (no benefit data available); 
(3) Persons enrolled in plans with uncommon benefit designs such as 3-Tier Non 
Formulary Benefit Design. 
 
The final dataset included records of more than 10,000,000 beneficiaries and their 
related retail prescription information from Oct. 1, 2010 until Jun. 30, 2013. The dataset 
included three portions: Pharmacy Claims File, Member Information File, and Benefits 
Information File.  
Pharmacy claims file included: CAG (De-identified carried ID, Account ID and 
Group ID), De-identified Member ID, Date of Birth, Sex, Zip Code, Date of Service, 
Filled Year, Days Supply Weighted Claim Count, Days Supply, Generic Product 
Identifier (GPI) Number, Product Service ID (NDC), Client Claim Cost, Client Member 
Pay, Client Plan Pay, Plan Drug Status, Formulary Status, Generic Flag, Deliver Channel, 
and Drug Category. 
Member information file included: CAG, De-identified Member ID, Sex, Date of 
Birth, Zip Code, Prospective Risk and Monthly Enrollment Status. 
Benefits Information file included: CAG, Mandatory Mail, Mandatory Generic, 
Individual & Family Deductible Amount, Individual & Family Yearly Out-of-pocket 
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Maximum Limit, Copayment or Coinsurance of generics, Copayment or Coinsurance of 
preferred brands, Copayment or Coinsurance of non-preferred brands, Minimum 
Coinsurance Amount of each tier, Maximum Coinsurance Amount of each tier, and 
Formulary Tiers Field.  
All three files contained a CAG identifier or a re-identified Member ID to link 
with each other.  
 
4.1.2 Study time frame  
 
This study established a 12-month pre- and post-implementation period based on 
the date when a new benefit plan was launched. The study design allowed beneficiaries to 
enter the study cohort up to 15 months prior to the earliest index date, but considered 
only 12 months of pre-implementation data.  
The time frame of the study is from October 1, 2010 to June 30, 2013 (33 
months). Figure 6 below shows the time frame based on the defined study periods. 
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Figure 6 Study time framework 
 
Time intervals of the time frame are defined below: 
Rx carry over period (10/1/2010-12/31/2010) is a 3-month period of time 
utilized to account for the overlapping pharmacy claims (e.g., an early refill) and to 
ensure the most accurate PDC calculation during the pre-implementation period.  
Overlapping pharmacy claims are accessed for PDC calculation based on the assumption 
that the prior supply is taken fully before the new supply is initiated.  
Pre-implementation period (1/1/2011-12/31/2011) is a 12-month period of time, 
in which the variables such as historical PDC and GDR are determined.  Pre-
implementation period is utilized to ratify provider determinants.  
Contract renewal period/Identification period (1/1/2012-6/30/2012) is a 6-
month period of time, in which pharmacy benefit plan changes were determined. The first 
6 months was included to observe benefit plan changes, because the largest number of 
contract renewals generally happens at the beginning of the calendar year.  
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The index date is the first day of the month when apparent contract renewal 
occurred. The earliest possible index date for the study was Jan. 1, 2011. The exact 
implementation date for each employer was not revealed in order to protect the 
employers’ anonymity and for small employers the anonymity of individual employees. 
Post-implementation period (2/1/2012-06/30/2013) is a 12-month period of time 
after the month of the index date, in which the primary variables of interest, PDC and 
GDR, were determined.  As an example, if contract renewal occurred on Jan.1, 2012, the 
period 2/1/2012-1/31/2013 is the post-implementation period; contract renewal on Jun. 1, 
2012 has a post-implementation period of 7/1/2012- 6/30/2013. 
Analysis period (1/1/2011-6/30/2013) is a 30-month period of time that includes 
both pre- and post-period. Beneficiaries in the study period were tracked from the date 
they fill their first eligible prescription and measured yearly PDC of both pre-
implementation period and post-implementation period. 
 
4.1.3 Identification of subjects  
 
Inclusion criteria: To be included in the analytic sample, beneficiaries were 
required: 
 
1) To be continuously enrolled for all 33 months of the study (Oct. 1, 2010 — 
Jun. 30, 2013); 
2) To have benefit information included in the benefit file; 
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3) To have a zip code number included in the enrollment file that could be 
matched to 2010 census data; 
4) To be 18 years of age or older at the beginning of the study period; and 
5) To have retail prescriptions for diabetes, hypertension, or hyperlipidemia in the 
pre-implementation period, with the diagnosis determined using Medispan 
Generic Product Identifier (GPI) numbers included in the pharmacy claims file 
(see Table 4).  
 
Three criteria were applied when selecting the primary medications of interest 
under study:  
 
(1) The medications need to be identified as Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) adherence categories in Star Rating. 
(2) The medications are limited to medications designated as chronic therapy in 
the Prime data file;  
(3) The population of the users must be of a sufficient size to make inferences 
about the population at large. 
 
Medication classes using the GPI code were used to assign beneficiaries to one or 
more of the three disease states. The same beneficiary could be assigned to all three-
disease groups if his/her claim history had medications representing all three diseases. 
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Table 4 GPI codes for medications treating diabetes, hypertension, and 
hyperlipidemia 
 
* GPI is a 14-character hierarchical drug classification system that consists of seven 
couplets including drug group, drug class, drug sub-class, drug name, drug name 
extension, dosage form, and strength. Products with the same GPI code are 
pharmaceutically equivalent.  
 
Oral Antidiabetes Agents 
Therapeutic Class GPI* 
Amylin Analogs, Incretin Mimetic Agents 2715, 2717 
Sulfonylureas 2720, 279970, 279978 
Amino Acid Derivatives, Meglitinide 
Analogues, Alpha-Glucosidase Inhibitors 
2723, 2728, 279950, 2750 
Biguanides 2725, 279925, 279950, 279960, 279970, 
279980, 279990 
Dipeptidyl Peptidase-4 (DPP-4) Inhibitors 2755, 279925, 279930, 279940 
Dopamine Receptor Agonists 2757 
Thiazolidinediones 2760, 279940, 279978, 279980 
Sodium-Glucose Co-transporter 2 (SGLT2) 
Inhibitors 
2770, 279960 
Antihypertensive Agents 
Therapeutic Class GPI 
ACE Inhibitors, Angiotensin II Receptor 
Blockers (ARBs), Renin Inhibitors  
3610, 3615, 3617, 369915, 369918, 
369930, 369940, 369945, 369960, 
369965, 369967  
Beta Blockers  33100005, 33100007, 33100010, 
33100025, 33100030, 33100040, 
33100050, 3320, 3330, 369920  
Calcium Channel Blockers  34, 409925, 369915, 369930, 369945  
Diuretics (includes Spironolactone and 
Eplerenone, Acetazolamide)  
3710, 3720, 3750, 3760, 379900, 
369910, 369918, 369920, 369940, 
369945, 369950, 369955, 369960, 
369990, 3625  
Miscellaneous: Vasodilators (Hydralazine,  
minoxidil, Nitroprusside, Fenoldopam), 
Clonidine, Guanfacine, Methyldopa, Alpha 
blockers, Phenoxybenzamine, 
Phentolamine, Metyrosine, Diazoxide, 
Mecamylamine, Metyrosine, Tolazoline  
3620, 3630, 3640, 3660, 369910, 
369950, 369955, 369990  
 
Antihyperlipidemia Agents (i.e., Statins) 
Therapeutic Class GPI 
HMG CoA Reductase Inhibitors 3940, 399940, 409925 
	   50	  
The requirement of continuous enrollment ensures that results are not biased by 
differential attrition of participants and nonparticipants. The requirement of age is to 
make sure that the beneficiaries have the ability of making independent decision about 
their medications, so that their voluntary medication taking behavior can be evaluated 
precisely. To examine PDC changes, beneficiaries must have at least one pharmacy claim 
designated as chronic therapy for those three diseases and remain on the medication for at 
least 28 days in the pre-observation period. The requirements of at least 28 days supply is 
to avoid including beneficiaries who cannot tolerate the drug or for whom the drug is not 
effective with a small initial supply. The requirement of matching with 2010 census data 
enables the collection of some demographics data such as education, income, and race. 
Exclusion criteria: Beneficiaries were excluded: 
 
1) If they obtained any medications through mail-order pharmacies  
2) If they had missing data in demographics or benefit information; 
3) If their benefit plan changes and contract renewal occurred outside contract 
renewal period (1/1/2012- 6/30/2012); 
4) If the information in the benefit file is not consistent with the claim 
adjudication identified in the prescription claims file; 
5) If enrolled in CAGs with fewer than 15 beneficiaries. 
 
4.1.4 Construction of study cohorts 
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Once all subjects were identified, they were classified into three-disease cohorts 
(Diabetes cohort, Hypertension cohort, and Hyperlipidemia cohort) if beneficiaries with 
claims generally used to treat these conditions.  
For each disease cohort, they were further classified into two groups—
beneficiaries who experienced a change in benefit design during the study period (the 
experimental group) and who did not experience a benefit design change (the concurrent 
control group). Pre and post quasi-experimental design with control group was used to 
assess interventions applied at the individual level.  This design was chosen to avoid the 
impact of regression to the mean and maturation effects. 
The experimental group was defined as beneficiaries who obtained prescription 
drugs prior to and following a contract renewal that included one or more changes to their 
pharmacy benefits.  
In the experimental group, the study assumed the contract renewal happened 
between Jan.1, 2012 and Jun. 30, 2012. Beneficiaries with contract renewals that 
included benefit changes occurring outside the period were excluded. Since the benefit 
file did not provide plan renewal date, the renewal dates of all subjects were estimated 
based on the pharmacy claims file. For beneficiaries with benefit changes, the amount 
paid by beneficiaries for prescription fills would be different from the amount paid for 
fills of prescriptions before contract renewal (or the index date). To determine this, 
beneficiaries were sorted into CAGs and their claims histories were reviewed to 
determine the cost share differences paid prior to Jan. 1, 2012 and the period from Jan. 1, 
2012 to Dec. 31, 2012. Once a cost share difference was noted for any claims by any 
beneficiary, all beneficiaries in the CAG were assigned to the experimental group. The 
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index date was determined to be the earliest date in the period from Jan. 1, 2012 and Dec. 
31, 2012 when a change was identified. This assignment was considered the best option 
to determine the index date, because individual beneficiaries do not experience benefit 
design changes alone; all beneficiaries in the CAGs experience the same benefit design 
changes. However, this method of determining the index date requires availability of a 
sufficient number of adjudicated claims. In some instances, an index date could not be 
identified and the decision was made to exclude these CAGs.  
The control group was defined as beneficiaries who obtained prescription drugs 
prior to and following a contract renewal that did not include evidence of a change in 
pharmacy benefits using the same method of index date determination described above. 
A random selection of three beneficiaries without benefit design changes was made using 
matching criteria of sex for each beneficiary in the experimental group.  Prior to data 
analysis, the balance between the experimental and control group was verified to ensure 
validity of comparison. 
 
4.2 Outcome measures 
4.2.1 Measure of medication adherence 
 
As a dependent variable, medication adherence was measured for a 12-month 
period of time beginning the first month following index date (i.e., the estimated contract 
renewal date).   
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Medication adherence can be measured directly or indirectly. Direct measurement 
includes direct measures of the drug and its metabolites in biological fluid and direct 
observation of drug taking behavior. Direct measurement is rarely used because of the 
complexity of obtaining biological samples or observing patients and the high associated 
costs of these methods. Indirect measures include medication monitoring (e.g., pill 
counts), self-report measures, and prescription claims data. Both medication monitoring 
and self-report measures require extra labor and, therefore, high associated costs for data 
collection; self-report measures carry concern about bias. This leaves claims data as a 
likely data source. 
The use of prescription claims data is the most common approach to study refill 
adherence. While there are several measurement metrics to study adherence based on 
claims data(Christian-Herman et al., 2004; D'Souza et al., 2008; Gibson et al., 2010), 
medication possession ratio (MPR) and proportion of days covered (PDC) are the two 
recommended measures(Karve et al., 2008). MPR is defined as the sum of the days 
supply for all claims during a defined period of time (e.g., 12 months) divided by the 
number of days elapsed during the period. PDC is defined as the ratio of the number of 
“usable” days supplied from all refills to the total number of days following (and 
including) medication initiation during a determined period of time (e.g., 12 months). The 
rule for interpreting adherence is the same for both measures—beneficiaries with a MPR 
or PDC of at least 80% are considered medication adherent. Above 80% is usually 
considered to be the range when the medication has a likelihood of achieving the most 
clinical benefit. 
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It should be noted that MPR has been criticized for overestimating adherence 
since MPR is the simple summation of days of supply. In contrast, when calculating the 
numerator for the PDC, the researcher should create vectors to reflect the dates that are 
encompassed by each medication fill.  The denominator for the PDC is the number of 
days between the first prescription claim during the analysis period and the end of the 
analysis period. This is considered a more accurate reflection of adherence. Additionally, 
more variations in MPR calculations exist than PDC. MPR is not operationally defined as 
consistently as PDC. The differences between those two methods are more substantial for 
beneficiaries taking multiple drugs within a broad class (e.g., all oral anti-diabetics) as it 
is in this study(Martin et al., 2009). Therefore, PDC is the preferred methodology to 
measure medication adherence.  
In this study, medications filled to treat the target conditions (i.e., diabetes, 
hypertension, and hyperlipidemia) are included to calculate PDC. The method of PDC 
calculation as specified by the Pharmacy Quality Alliance (PQA) is shown in table 5. 
Interval based method with “at least one” definition was applied. Because of the limited 
penetration of electronic prescribing, it may be politically and practically most reasonable 
to use a measure that is sensitive to non-adherence(Choudhry et al., 2009). 
PDC can be measured as a continuous variable, but more frequently it is reported 
as a categorical variable. The most common categorization is dichotomous: a PDC of 
80% or above is considered as medication adherence, and a PDC of less than 80% is 
considered to be not adherent (Simpson & Mendys, 2010). 
 
Table 5 PQA measure specifications of PDC 
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Steps Calculation Method 
1 Determine the beneficiary’s measurement period, defined as the index 
prescription date (e.g., first fill of medication) to the end of the measurement 
period (e.g., Dec. 31, 2011). 
2 Within the measurement period, count the days when the beneficiary is covered 
by at least one drug in the class (e.g., oral anti-diabetics) based on the 
prescription fill date and days of supply. If prescription fills for the same drug 
overlap, then adjust the prescription start date to be the day after the previous fill 
has ended. No adjustment is needed if beneficiaries are taking multiple drugs 
within a broad class.  
3 Divide the number of covered days found in Step 2 by the number of days found 
in Step 1. Multiply this number by 100 to obtain the PDC (as a percentage) for 
each beneficiary. 
 
 
An example of the PDC calculation for all oral anti-diabetes agents is shown in 
figure 7. For the purpose of this example, the study pre-period is calendar year 2011. As 
the start date of the measurement period is January 1, 2011, any prescription fills prior to 
that date are excluded, even though the impact of such a fill may extend into the 
measurement period. Thus, the 30-day supply filled on December 20, 2010 is excluded. 
The “at least 1” method is used in the calculation — days covered by at least one drug in 
the broad class during the analysis period are counted and used as the numerator. 
Therefore, in this example, there are 123 days covered by the prescription fills in the pre-
period. The denominator is calculated as the number of days between the first fill of the 
medication (i.e., Jun.28, 2011) during the measurement period and the end of the pre-
period (i.e., Jan.1, 2011 — Dec. 31, 2011), which is 187 days.  The index date is the first 
day of the month when the beneficiary’s contract renewed. The example assumed the 
index date was Jan.1, 2011. Thus, the post-period starts Feb.1 and lasts for a 12-month 
period (i.e., Feb.1, 2012 — Jan. 31, 2013) and the PDC for the post period is calculated. 
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In summary, for this example, PDC for the pre- and post-period are 65.78% and 49.02%, 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 7 Prescription fill pattern and PDC calculation illustration 
 
4.2.2 Measure of generic utilization  
 
CMS has suggested that monitoring utilization of generic drugs would help to 
control drug costs and promote access to affordable prescription drugs. The generic 
dispensing rate (GDR) measure has been one of the most frequently reported utilization 
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metrics adopted as an indicator of pharmacy benefit performance, and has become a key 
performance metric for CMS and managed care organizations.   
The GDR performance metric is derived by dividing the total number of generic 
prescriptions by the total number of prescriptions dispensed per beneficiary in a given 
period. This metric takes into account all dispensed drugs regardless of whether they have 
a generic equivalent or not. All drug fills were adjusted to a supply weighted claim count 
(1 weighted claim count equals to a 30-day equivalent prescription). The method of GDR 
calculation in this study is showed in table 6. 
 
Table 6 GDR measures  
 
Steps Calculation Method 
1 Determined the beneficiary’s measurement period; pre-period was defined as a 
calendar year before the index date (e.g., Jan. 1, 2011 — Dec. 31, 2011); post-
period was defined as a calendar year after the month of index date (e.g., Feb.1, 
2012 — Jan. 31, 2013).  
2 Within the measurement period (e.g., pre-period), sum the supply weighted 
claim count of each generic claim for each beneficiary.  
3 Within the measurement period (e.g., pre-period), sum the supply weighted 
claim count of each claim for each beneficiary. 
4 Divide the number found in Step 2 by the number in Step 3. Multiply this 
number by 100 to obtain the GDR for each beneficiary. 
 
4.3 Measure of predictors 
  
Hypothesis 1 proposes to identify whether any benefit changes would have 
affected medication adherence or generic utilization. A dummy indicator was thus 
designed to assess benefit design changes.  
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Hypothesis 2 proposes to identify factors among cost sharing strategies that were 
associated with study outcomes. A series of categorical variables were created to indicate 
the changes in cost sharing strategies. 
 
4.3.1 Benefit design changes 
 
A dummy indicator was used to allow tracking of beneficiaries who were in 
experimental group, experiencing one or more benefits changed during the process of 
contract renewal. Beneficiaries who had any changes in benefits during allowable 
contract renewal period were selected into the experimental group.  
 
4.3.2 Changes in cost sharing strategies 
  
A series of categorical variables were created to indicate the changes in cost 
sharing strategies among all tiers, including the indicators of copayment and coinsurance. 
Further explanations of those variables are as follow: 
 
1) Three categorical variables indicated the change trends of copayment for 
generics, preferred brands, and non-preferred brands respectively; 
2) Three categorical variables indicated the change trends of coinsurance for 
generics, preferred brands, and non-preferred brands respectively. 
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4.4 Measure of control variables 
 
Using Andersen’s behavioral model of health services utilization, the control 
variables in this study were classified into three categories: predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors. 
 
4.4.1 Predisposing characteristics 
 
Age: Age was identified at the beginning of the pre-intervention period (i.e., Jan. 
1, 2011) from the member information file. It was calculated as an integer from the date 
of birth until Jan.1, 2011.  
Sex: Sex (male/female) was also identified from member information file. 
Education: Because beneficiaries’ educational level was not available from the 
dataset, education was identified from the Census 2010 Data based on the beneficiary’s 
zip code of residence.  
Race: Because beneficiaries’ race information was not available in the dataset, 
race was identified from the Census 2010 Data based on the beneficiary’s zip code of 
residence.  
 
4.4.2 Enabling resources 
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Household income: As beneficiaries’ income information was not available from 
the dataset, median household income from the 2010 U.S. Census was identified based on 
the beneficiary’s zip code of residence. 
 
4.4.3 Need factors 
 
Prospective Risk Score was provided by Prime to assess a beneficiary’s “health 
risk”. The calculation of prospective risk score is based on Optum Symmetry Pharmacy 
Risk Groups® (PRG). The PRG should be considered as a proxy for severity of illness. It 
is determined using proprietary algorithms based on filled prescription claims data during 
the year prior to the index date, and predicts future resource use and expenditure and thus 
allows for risk adjustment in the absence of medical claims data. A relative risk score of 
1.0 indicates average risk, above 1.0 indicates higher than average risk, and below 1.0 
indicates lower than average risk. It has been used to illuminate the effect of disease 
severity on episode costs because of its established predictive ability and industry 
acceptance(Liliedahl, Finch, Axene, & Goertz, 2010).  
The illustration below (Figure 8) provides an overview of the PRG process to 
calculate prospective risk score. The PRG risk output is named as the prospective risk 
score in this study.  
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*From: INGENIX symmetry pharmacy risk groups concepts guide version 7.6 
Figure 8 Pharmacy risk score calculation process 
 
Number of medications is defined as the total number of unique medications taken 
by the beneficiary in the pre-intervention period. Because the number of pharmacy visits 
that beneficiaries make to pick up prescriptions (the extent of prescribing and filling 
complexity) was association with adherence(Choudhry et al., 2011), number of 
medications was included as a control variable in this study. For analysis purpose, the 
variable was calculated based on Product Service ID in the claims file and categorized 
into four levels.  
 
Table 7 shows the definitions and measures for each study variable.  
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Table 7 Definitions and measures of dependent and independent variables  
Dependent 
Variables 
Measurement Operationalization  
Adherence  PDC: The ratio of the number of days with at least 
one retail refill to the total number of calendar days 
following (and including) medication initiation 
during a determined period of time (i.e., pre- and 
post-period). 
0: PDC<80%; 1: 
PDC>=80%; 
Dichotomous;  
Or 0—100%; 
Continuous 
Generic 
utilization  
GDR: The total number of retail generic 
prescription claims dispensed divided by the total 
number of retail prescription claims for the 
beneficiary during a determined period of time (i.e., 
pre- and post-period). 
0—100%; 
Continuous 
 
Predictor 
Variables 
Definition Measure Operationalization 
Benefit 
design 
changes 
One or more benefits 
(e.g., deductible, 
copayment, coinsurance, 
OOP limits, mandatory 
mail, or mandatory 
generic) changed during 
contract renewal. 
 A categorical 
indicator is used to 
allow tracking of 
beneficiaries who 
were in the 
experimental group. 
1: Experimental 
Group;  
0: Control Group; 
Dichotomous 
Copayment  The amount paid by the 
beneficiary at the 
counter, including copays 
for generics, preferred 
brands, and non-
preferred brands. 
A categorical variable 
indicate the change 
trend of copayment for 
generics, preferred 
brands, and non-
preferred brands. 
Categorical: 
-1: Decrease; 
0: No changes; 
1: Increase 
 
Coinsurance The percentage amount 
paid by the beneficiary at 
the counter, including 
coinsurance for generics, 
preferred brands, and 
non-preferred brands. 
A categorical variable 
indicate the change 
trend of coinsurance 
for generics, preferred 
brands, and non-
preferred brands. 
Categorical: 
-1: Decrease; 
0: No changes; 
1: Increase 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Definition Measure Operationalization 
Age  The age of the 
beneficiary on Jan. 1, 
2011. 
An integer calculated 
from the date of birth 
until Jan. 1, 2011 
Continuous 
 
Sex   The gender of the 
beneficiary according to 
the enrollment file. 
Male/Female 1: Male; 0: Female; 
Dichotomous 
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Education  The percentage of 
residents that obtained 
bachelor’s degree or 
above in the individual’s 
home zip code area. 
Percentage of adults 
>= 25 years of age 
with >=college 
education; 
Census 2010 data 
based on individual’s 
home zip codes. 
0—100%; 
Continuous 
Race  The percentage of 
residents those were 
white in the individual’s 
home zip code area. 
Percentage of 
individuals self-
reporting white; 
Census 2010 data 
based on individual’s 
home zip codes. 
0—100%; 
Continuous  
Income  Median household 
income in the 
individual’s home zips 
code area. 
A categorical variable 
indicated whether the 
median household 
income was above 
$50,000 or not; 
Census 2010 data 
based on individual’s 
home zip codes. 
0: Median 
Income<$50,000; 
1: Median 
Income>$50,000; 
Dichotomous 
Number of 
medications 
Total number of different 
medications in the pre-
intervention period (i.e., 
12 months). 
A categorical variable 
indicated the level of 
medications 
consumed.  
Categorical: 
0: 1-5; 
1: 6-10 
2: 10-15; 
3: >=16 
Prospective 
Risk Score 
It is the member’s 
pharmacy risk group for 
the 12 months (i.e., 2012) 
directly following the 
claims experience period 
(i.e., 2011). 
A continuous variable 
with higher numbers 
indicating higher risk. 
Continuous  
(Range: 0.0324-
74.8423) 
 
4.5 Statistical analysis  
  
All statistical analyses were conducted using SAS Version 9.2 (SAS Institute Inc., 
Cary, NC, USA). The significance level was set at 0.001(2-tailed), a more rigorous 
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significance level to take into account of the large sample size identified (Lin, Lucas, & 
Shmueli, 2013).  
 
4.5.1 Descriptive analysis 
  
Descriptive statistics were used to summarize patient demographics, as well as the 
measures of medication adherence and generic utilization. Numbers, percentages, and 
odds ratio were provided for dichotomous or categorical variables. Means, range, 
standard deviations (S.D.), minimum values, 25% percentiles, medians, 75% percentiles, 
and maximum values were calculated for continuous variables.  
Two-group tests were applied to make comparisons of changes (e.g., Post-PDC 
minus Pre-PDC) in the outcomes in the experimental and control group. Student’s t tests 
were used for continuous outcomes (PDC and GDR) and Chi-square tests were used for 
count outcomes (e.g., number of adherent beneficiaries). These two-group tests offer 
simplicity and straightforward interpretability of the results, but do not adjust for 
confounders without multiple levels of stratification. Additionally, two-group tests detect 
changes in adherence levels but not changes in trends.   
  
4.5.2 Regression  
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Multi-variate techniques were employed to examine the difference in PDC and 
GDR between the two identified groups taking into account of confounding variables. 
Both general linear regression and logistic regression were conducted. 
Some researchers use simple ordinary least square regression with a Gaussian 
distributional assumption because of the simplicity of this technique. Some critics point 
out that the use of linear regression violates both normality and homoscedasticity 
assumptions, and therefore, should conduct Tobit, NLS (nonlinear least squares), 
Fractional Logit models, Beta regression, or Simplex regression to handle proportional 
outcomes like those in this study. However, assumptions of these alternative regression 
techniques could still be violated since they too carry assumptions of normality or 
homoscedasticity. 
The two-limit Tobit model is one of the most recommended models when 
handling proportion outcomes. A fundamental argument against its censoring assumption 
is that values out of [0, 1] is not a result of the censorship but due to the fact that they are 
not defined. Tobit model is also based on normal distribution and subject to 
homoscedasticity.  
A Logit model (e.g., a logistic function of GDR/(1 − GDR)), Beta regression, and 
Simplex regression are generally used with the open interval of (0, 1). But in this study, a 
sufficient number of beneficiaries might have PDC or GDR equaled to 1, which makes it 
more complex to use any of these other regression techniques. 
When counting numbers of binary outcomes of a Bernoulli distributed random 
process, it might be appropriate to model proportion with the assumption of binomial 
error structure, such as logistic regression. However, when using the proportion to 
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standardize and relativize continuous data, there is not unanimous consensus on either the 
distributional assumption or the modeling practice.  Therefore, in this study, general 
linear regression modeling is the most robust model and was conducted to estimate 
medication adherence and generic utilization. To estimate the effect of policy changes, 
dummy indicators were used to allow tracking of beneficiaries who were in control 
group. Those indicators are the primary variables of interest. 
To address this controversy a multiple logistic regression with categorized PDC 
was also conducted. Logistic regression model was conducted to quantify the relationship 
between medication adherence and benefit changes, allowing for statistical control of 
known confounders.  
Data on income, education, and race were obtained by linking beneficiaries’ ZIP 
codes of residence with 2010 Census data from the US Census Bureau. The census data 
specified the median income, percentage of bachelor degree, and percentage of white 
among the geographic population associated with each ZIP code. In the study, income 
was dichotomized as being more or less than $50,000. 
 
4.5.2.1 General linear model (GLM) 
 
GLM were used for continuous normally distributed outcomes, such as PDC and 
GDR. GLM included a constant term, a binary indicator for exposure (such as having or 
not having benefit design changes), and adjusted variables for beneficiary’s age, sex, 
race, income, education, number of prescriptions, and comorbidity burden (using 
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prospective risk score) as of the date of their cohort entry. Parameter estimates were 
presented. 95% confidence intervals (CI) and associated P-values were reported as well. 
 
4.5.2.2 Logistic regression 
 
When logistic regression was conducted, PDC was defined as a dichotomous 
variable (e.g., PDC >= 80%).  The logistic regression model also included predictor 
variables ─ beneficiary’s age, sex, race, income, education and prospective risk as of the 
date of their cohort entry as defined previously.  
 Only variables with a p-value of less than 0.001 were considered significant. 
Statistically significant variables were presented and reported as adjusted odds ratio 
(ORs); 95% confidence intervals (CI) and associated P-values were also reported as well. 
 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
 
A limited data set was received after all direct individual identifiers were removed 
from the data according to the requirements of HIPAA. It is impossible to identify an 
individual through the information provided by the dataset used in this study. The study 
was approved by University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board (See Appendix 
2). 
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Chapter 5 Results 
 
This chapter presents the results of statistical analysis. Study subjects and their 
general characteristics, descriptive statistics of variables, and results of the three 
statistical models.  
 
5.1 Data extraction and cohort construction 
5.1.1 Data extraction 
 
Figure 9 shows the beneficiary selection flowchart leading to the definitions of the 
three-study cohorts (diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia). There were more than 
10,000,000 records of beneficiaries in the member file. Among them, 3,074,370 eligible 
beneficiaries continuously enrolled from Oct. 1, 2010 to Dec. 31, 2013. Among these 
continuously enrolled beneficiaries, 96,013 beneficiaries had no benefit records or zip 
code information; 737,825 beneficiaries were less than 18 years of age on Jan.1, 2011; 
33,009 beneficiaries’ demographic data could not be matched to 2010 census data. Thus, 
leaving 2,207883 beneficiaries.  
Among the remaining 2,207883 beneficiaries, there were a total of 79,430,151 
prescription records during the observation period. Among those fill records, 24,684,755 
claims were prescribed for the chronic diseases diabetes, hypertension and 
hyperlipidemia. 73.73% (18,200,665) of the claims were retail orders. As a result, 
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577,725 beneficiaries with pharmacy claims indicative of the three diseases were 
identified.  
One final exclusion criterion was applied at this stage. In order to study adherence 
as proposed in this study, PDC in 2011 could not be 0; therefore, beneficiaries were 
required to have at least one prescription claim for a drug indicative of the study diseases 
in 2011. The number of qualified beneficiaries was thus reduced to 450,899; 77,511 
beneficiaries had prescription claims for diabetes drugs, 360,768 beneficiaries had 
prescription claims for hypertension drugs, and 206,258 beneficiaries had prescription 
claims for hyperlipidemia drugs. 
 
 
Figure 9 The beneficiary flowchart  
 
	   70	  
Contract renewal dates were estimated as described in Chapter 4 (Methods). From 
2011 to 2012, there were 7,483 different types of benefit plan changes. Beneficiaries with 
benefit plan changes but a contract renewal date that occurred outside of the specified 
study period were excluded. Some beneficiaries identified with benefit changes had 
claims records with amounts paid after the contract renewal date that were inconsistent 
with the amount paid before the contract renewal and were excluded from the final 
sample. In addition, about 5% of beneficiaries identified with benefit changes were 
excluded because the cost sharing benefits included in the benefit information file were 
inconsistent with the dollar amounts included in their prescription claim files. 
 
5.1.2 Cohort construction 
 
Table 8 summarizes beneficiaries’ medication claims for the drug therapy classes 
of interest in the pre-period. Beneficiaries with anti-hypertension agents accounted for the 
largest proportion (46.14%); beneficiaries taking both anti-diabetes agents and anti-
hyperlipidemia (statins) agents accounted for the smallest proportion (1.52%). 
Beneficiaries were enrolled into a disease cohort as long as their prescription claims 
history included claims for drugs that treated the disease (i.e., a beneficiary could be 
assigned to more than one disease cohort depending on his/her prescription claims 
history). For example, 4.95% of the subjects taking both anti-diabetic agents and anti-
hypertensive agents were enrolled into both the diabetes and hypertension cohorts. 
 
Table 8 Beneficiaries’ medications taken in the pre-period  
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Drugs taken by beneficiaries  Number of 
Beneficiaries 
Percent  
Anti-diabetes agents 14,013 3.14 
Anti-hypertension agents 205,762 46.14 
Anti-hyperlipidemia agents 68,372 15.33 
Anti-diabetes agents & Anti-hypertension agents 22,065 4.95 
Anti-diabetes agents & Anti-hyperlipidemia agents 6,772 1.52 
Anti-hypertension agents & Anti-hyperlipidemia agents 95,204 21.35 
Anti-diabetes agents & Anti-hypertension agents & Anti-
hyperlipidemia agents 
33,795 7.58 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the selected beneficiaries with plan changes and contract renewal 
within the first six months of 2012. A total of 45,850 beneficiaries met the criteria and 
were enrolled into the experimental groups. Beneficiaries (400,133) without benefit 
changes were about 9 times more than the experimental group. Therefore, the final 
control groups were randomly selected and were three times the number of those in the 
experimental group for each disease cohort respectively.  
 
 
Figure 10 Number of beneficiaries with plan changes occurring in the first 6 months 
of 2012 
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For the experimental group, beneficiaries’ tier structures are shown in table 9.  
More beneficiaries were in plans with one tier in pre-intervention period compared to 
pre-intervention period. One possible explanation for this finding is that more and more 
beneficiaries have chosen to enroll in high deductible health plans. 
 
Table 9 Tier changes of the selected population in experimental group  
Tier 
structure 
Pre-Period Post-Period 
 Frequency Percent% Frequency Percent% 
1 4,677 10.20 4,815 10.50 
2 5,118 11.60 5,342 11.65 
3 36,055 78.63 35,683 77.82 
  
The number of beneficiaries and their retail copayment designs in 2011 and 2012 
are shown in table 10. A zero dollar copayment most likely indicates that a beneficiary’s 
prescription drug benefits design included a coinsurance design for prescription drugs. It 
might also indicate no copayment needed for those drugs (about 10%). For generic drugs, 
the most common copayment designs in 2011 were $5, $8, $10, $15, $20 and $25, while 
the most commonly occurring copayment designs in 2012 were $4, $5, $7.5, $10, $15, 
and $20.  For preferred brand name drugs, the most common copayment designs in 2011 
were $20, $25, $30, $35, and $40, while the most commonly occurring in 2012 were $20, 
$30, $35, $40, and $50.  For non-preferred brand name drugs, the most common 
copayment designs in 2011 were $20, $35, $40, $45, $50, and $60, while the most 
commonly occurring in 2012 were $20, $50, and $60. 
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Table 10 Beneficiaries and their retail copayment designs in pre- and post-period 
Copayment design for 
generic drugs (Tier 1)$ 
Frequency in Pre-period Frequency in Post-
period 
0 11,160 14,569 
2 14 0 
3 3 52 
4 4 1033 
4.5 0 1 
5 5995 4033 
5.5 1 0 
6 36 0 
7 50 10 
7.5 11 969 
8 1047 122 
9 99 6 
10 18119 12521 
11 6 5 
12 19 15 
12.5 6 0 
13 1 0 
14 190 0 
15 6916 10684 
18 35 0 
20 1086 1750 
25 1042 57 
30 10 23 
Copayment design for 
preferred brand drugs 
(Tier 2)$ 
Frequency in 2011 Frequency in 2012 
0 12948 14594 
3 0 1 
4.5 0 1 
5 1 0 
5.5 1 0 
7 1 0 
7.5 2 0 
8 6 0 
9 5 0 
10 310 8 
11 213 0 
12 43 210 
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15 497 108 
20 4792 3066 
24 2 9 
25 10965 1585 
26 2 2 
29 1 3 
30 8848 11927 
35 3901 5557 
36 35 0 
40 2043 6039 
45 21 239 
50 1164 2422 
60 48 79 
75 1 0 
Copayment design for 
non-preferred brand 
drugs (Tier 3)$ 
Frequency in 2011 Frequency in 2012 
0 13434 15112 
4.5 0 1 
5.5 1 0 
8 1 1 
9 3 0 
10 12 2 
11 210 0 
12 19 210 
15 29 39 
20 2200 2050 
22 29 0 
24 0 7 
25 116 13 
26 3 0 
30 506 81 
35 2043 610 
40 3945 979 
45 3937 1616 
48 2 2 
50 12750 8254 
55 1697 918 
57 35 0 
 
The coinsurance designs and frequency of each design from 2011to 2012 are 
shown in table 11. A zero percent coinsurance most likely indicates that a beneficiary’s 
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prescription benefits design included a copayment for prescription drugs or that no 
coinsurance payment was needed for associated drugs (less than 5%). For generic drugs, 
the most common coinsurance designs in 2011 were 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, and 30%, 
while the most common ones in 2012 were 10%, 15%, 20%, and 30%.  For preferred 
brand name drugs, the most common coinsurance designs in both 2011 and 2012 were 
10%, 20%, 25%, 30%, and 50%. For non-preferred brand name drugs, the most common 
coinsurance designs in 2011 were 10%, 20%, 25%, 35%, 40%, and 50%, while the most 
common ones in 2012 were 20%, 30%, 35%, and 50%. 
 
Table 11 beneficiaries and their retail coinsurance designs in 2011 and 2012 
Coinsurance design for 
generic drugs (Tier 1)% 
Frequency in 2011 Frequency in 2012 
0 36069 35885 
5 5 0 
10 2458 2110 
15 1567 2888 
20 3494 3839 
25 1188 239 
30 657 586 
40 3 6 
50 277 251 
100 132 46 
Coinsurance design for 
preferred brand drugs 
(Tier 2)% 
Frequency in 2011 Frequency in 2012 
0 33995 33601 
10 1728 1856 
15 8 42 
20 2233 2872 
25 4179 2382 
30 1234 2923 
35 1537 1498 
40 48 85 
50 553 528 
60 196 10 
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100 139 53 
Coinsurance design for 
non-preferred brand 
drugs (Tier 3)% 
Frequency in 2011 Frequency in 2012 
0 33521 34464 
10 1705 515 
15 8 42 
20 2024 2378 
25 1132 462 
30 722 1331 
35 1584 1399 
40 1012 595 
45 124 959 
50 3646 3406 
55 1 0 
60 232 246 
100 139 53 
 
 A total of 8164 CAGs with benefit changes were included in this study. Among 
them, 4393 CAGs changed mainly in the amount of copayment or percentage of 
coinsurance (type 1); 1116 CAGs changed from high deductible health plan with no cost 
sharing to benefit plans with cost sharing structures (type 2); 1450 CAGs changed from 
benefit plans with cost sharing structures to high deductible health plan with no cost 
sharing (type 3); and 1205 CAGs kept high deductible benefit designs with no cost 
sharing but changed the family or individual deductible amount (type 4).  
Table 12-15 shows the cost sharing changes and deductible amount changes for 
the four types. For type 1 (see Table 12), the average copayment of generics slightly 
increased from $12.1 to $12.6; the average coinsurance of generics slightly decreased 
from 26.4% to 23.7%; the average copayment of preferred brands increased from $30.1 
to $35.4; the average coinsurance of preferred brands decreased from 30.1% to 27.2%; 
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the average copayment of non-preferred brands increased from $48.7 to $56.6; the 
average coinsurance of non-preferred brands decreased from 42.7% to 36.3%. 
 
Table 12 Copayment and coinsurance changes of CAGs in type 1 from 2011 to 2012 
  Minimum Median Maximum Mean ± S.D. 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Copayment of 
generics ($) 
0 0 10 10 30 30 12.1±4.6 12.6 ±4.8 
Coinsurance of 
generics (%) 
0 0 25 20 100 100 26.4 ±15.8 23.7 ±14.6 
Copayment of 
preferred brands ($) 
5 3 30 35 75 70 30.1±8.8 35.4 ±7.6 
Coinsurance of 
preferred brands(%) 
10 10 25 25 100 100 30.1±15.5 27.2 ±15.7 
Copayment of non-
preferred brands ($) 
5 4.5 50 60 105 110 48.7±12.8 56.6 ±12.0 
Coinsurance of 
non-preferred 
brands(%) 
10 10 50 30 100 100 42.7 ±15.9 36.3 ±18.8 
 
For type 2 (see Table 13), some high deductible health plans with no cost sharing 
strategies changed to deductible health plans with cost sharing strategies. The average 
family deductible amount decreased from $6242.7 to $3337.1; the average individual 
deductible amount decreased from $3119.6 to $1298.2; the average copayment of 
generics became $11.0; the average coinsurance of generics became 19.9%; the average 
copayment of preferred brands became $35.4; the average coinsurance of preferred 
brands became 25.9%; the average copayment of non-preferred brands became $55.4; the 
average coinsurance of non-preferred brands became 35.9%. 
 
Table 13 Copayment, coinsurance and deductible changes of CAGs in type 2 from 
2011 to 2012 
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  Minimum Median Maximum Mean ± S.D. 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Family deductibles 
($) 
2400 60 6000 3000 11900 20000 6242.7 
±1818.5 
3337.1 
±2424.8 
Individual 
deductibles ($) 
1200 25 3000 1200 5950 10000 3119.6 
±909.7 
1298.2 
±1307.0 
Copayment of 
generics ($) 
 0  10  20  11.0±3.8 
Coinsurance of 
generics (%) 
 0  20  100  19.9±15.0 
Copayment of 
preferred brands ($) 
 15  35  60  35.4±8.7 
Coinsurance of 
preferred brands(%) 
 10  20  100  25.9±16.3 
Copayment of non-
preferred brands ($) 
 15  50  100  55.4±15.1 
Coinsurance of non-
preferred brands(%) 
 10   30  100  35.9±20.0 
 
For type 3 (see Table 14), some deductible health plans with cost sharing 
strategies changed to high deductible health plans with no cost sharing strategies. The 
average family deductible amount increased from $3259.1 to $7328.4; the average 
individual deductible amount increased from $1204.3 to $3699.6; the average copayment 
of generics was $11.0 in 2011; the average coinsurance of generics was 22.7% in 2011; 
the average copayment of preferred brands was $31.5 in 2011; the average coinsurance of 
preferred brands was 26.7% in 2011; the average copayment of non-preferred brands was 
$51.5 in 2011; the average coinsurance of non-preferred brands was 33.2% in 2011. 
 
Table 14 Copayment, coinsurance and deductible changes of CAGs in type 3 from 
2011 to 2012 
  Minimum Median Maximum Mean ± S.D. 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Family deductibles 
($) 
60 1000 3000 6000 40000 22500 3259.1±2
603.4 
7328.4±2
223.3 
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Individual 
deductibles ($) 
25 500 1000 3000 20000 10000 1204.3±1
330.1 
3699.6±1
196.8 
Copayment of 
generics ($) 
0  10  30  11.0±4.4  
Coinsurance of 
generics (%) 
0  20  100  22.7±20.2  
Copayment of 
preferred brands ($) 
5  30  60  31.5±8.8  
Coinsurance of 
preferred brands(%) 
10  20  100  26.7±18.3  
Copayment of non-
preferred brands ($) 
10  50  100  51.5±14.2  
Coinsurance of non-
preferred brands(%) 
10  20  100  33.2±21.0  
 
For type 4 (see Table 15), some high deductible health plans with no cost sharing 
strategies changed family or individual deductible amount. The average family deductible 
amount decreased from $7574.4 to $6611.6; the average individual deductible amount 
decreased from $3841.1 to $3311.7.  
 
Table 15 Deductible changes of CAGs in type 4 from 2011 to 2012 
  Minimum Median Maximum Mean ± S.D. 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Family deductibles 
($) 
2400 2000 7000 6000 22500 12000 7574.4±2
245.3 
6611.6±2
140.8 
Individual 
deductibles ($) 
1200 250 3500 3000 7500 10000 3841.1±1
138.2 
3311.7±1
196.3 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics of study variables 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
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Two dependent variables were identified for this study—medication adherence 
(measured as PDC) and generic utilization (measured as GDR) in the post-intervention 
period following contract renewal. This section presents the descriptive statistics for these 
two variables. 
 
5.2.1.1 Medication adherence 
  
Medication adherence was measured as Proportion of Days Covered (PDC), 
which was defined as the percentage of the number of days in the measurement period 
covered by at least one prescription claim for a drug treating the disease. In this study, the 
measurement period was a 12-month period of time beginning the first month after the 
month of the beneficiary’s index date. This definition follows the recommendations of PQA 
as identified in Chapter 4 (Methods). 
Table 16 presents the information concerning PDC during the 12 months after the 
index date (identified as “post-PDC” for the table). In each cohort, PDC was calculated at 
the disease level (i.e., for diabetes, all oral diabetes drugs were included; for hypertension, 
all hypertension drugs were included; for hyperlipidemia, all statin agents were included) for 
both the control and experimental groups. On average, regardless of disease cohort 
beneficiaries acquired medications to cover approximately 80% of the 12 months of 
treatment.  The PDCs of the experimental groups in all three cohorts were lower than the 
PDCs of the control groups. These differences, however, are not statistically significant. 
Based on the common definition of medication adherence (PDC>=80%), more than 60% 
of the beneficiaries were classified with adequate adherence in all three cohorts.  
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Table 16 Descriptive statistics of medication adherence (measured as PDC) in post-
intervention period  
 
 
5.2.1.2 Generic utilization 
 
Generic utilization was measured as the generic dispensing rate (GDR), which 
was defined as the percent of prescriptions in the measurement period dispensed using 
generic products for each beneficiary. In this study, the measurement period was 12 
months after a beneficiary’s index date. This definition is the most common definition 
used among pharmacy benefit managers and other managed care organizations as 
identified in Chapter 4 (Methods).  
Table 17 presents the information concerning GDR. In each cohort, GDR was 
calculated at the individual level for both the control and experimental groups. The mean 
GDR was greater than 75% for all three cohorts. There are only small differences in the 
GDR between the experimental groups and control groups within each disease cohort. 
These differences are not statistically significant. 
 
Post-PDC Diabetes Hypertension Hyperlipidemia 
Control   Exper Control   Exper Control   Exper 
Mean ± 
S.D. 
79.4±21.7% 78.8±22.1% 84.3±19.4% 83.8±19.5% 79.6±20.3% 79.5±20.4% 
Minimum  8.3% 8.3% 1.7% 3.4% 4.6% 8.9% 
25% 
Quartile  
67.5% 66.2% 78.3% 77.6% 70.0% 70.1% 
Median  88.3% 87.8% 92.8% 92.2% 87.7% 87.5% 
75% 
Quartile  
96.2% 96.2% 97.4% 97.2% 94.8% 94.8% 
Maximum  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
PDC>=80
%, n (%) 
11,869 
(63.0%) 
3,904 
(62.0%) 
66,385 
(73.3%) 
21,723 
(72.4%)  
30,697 
(63.9%) 
10,211 
(63.7%) 
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Table 17 Descriptive statistics of generic utilization (measured as GDR) in post-
intervention period 
 
5.2.2 Descriptive statistics of benefit design changes 
 
Benefit design changes that alter a beneficiary’s cost-share, and thereby influent a 
beneficiary’s adherence to prescribed medication and his/her decision to use generic 
alternatives to brand name medications is the primary focus of this study. This study has 
two measurement periods for these variables, the 12-month period prior to the index date 
and the 12-month period after the index date. Benefit designs and the related cost-sharing 
strategies for these two periods were identified for the experimental group in each of the 
three cohorts. This section provides information about the benefit design changes 
experienced by the experimental group. 
 
5.2.2.1 Benefit design changes of the experimental group 
 
Post-GDR Diabetes Hypertension Hyperlipidemia 
Control   Exper Control   Exper Control   Exper 
Mean ± 
S.D. 
75.1±21.8% 75.1±21.5% 80.2±22.8% 80.1±22.8% 76.7±24.3% 76.7±23.9% 
Minimum  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
25% 
Quartile  
61.3% 61.3% 67.6% 67.1% 62.7% 62.5% 
Median  78.5% 78.0% 88.2% 88.0% 82.8% 82.4% 
75% 
Quartile  
94.43% 94.3% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Maximum  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Tables 18, 19, and 20 present the benefit designs of the experimental group in the 
pre- and post-intervention period for the diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia 
cohorts, respectively.  
For all three cohorts, the vast majority of beneficiaries (more than 99%) did not 
have a mandatory mail requirement or a mandatory generic substitution requirement in 
either the pre- or post-intervention periods. A large number of beneficiaries did not have 
a deductible design (around 60%) or a maximum OOP limitation (around 80%).  A large 
percent of beneficiaries had a copayment design (around 75% had a copayment design 
for generics).  
The pharmacy benefit design of coinsurance only was uncommon. There were, 
however, a large number of beneficiaries having a mix of coinsurance and copayment 
designs. Beneficiaries with a copayment plus coinsurance design usually had a fixed 
copayment for generic products and a coinsurance design for brand products. For 
example, 25.8% of the beneficiaries had a coinsurance design for non-preferred brand 
name drugs while 76% of beneficiaries had a copayment design for generics in the pre-
period. Compared to the pre-period, fewer beneficiaries had a design of minimum 
coinsurance amount while more had a design of maximum coinsurance amount in the 
post-period.  
Overall, the benefit design changes from pre-intervention period to post-
intervention period were very similar among all three cohorts. Differences in benefit 
designs between the pre-period and post-period were tested using Chi-square. In general, 
significant differences were noted in the proportion of beneficiaries with mandatory 
generic, deductibles, copayments and coinsurance levels. There are some differences 
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between disease cohorts however. The significant changes that are noted are due to large 
sample size and may not represent meaningful differences. For example, in the 
hypertension cohort (Table 16), the proportion of beneficiaries with mandatory mail 
design decreased from 0.3% in the pre-period to 0.2% in the post-period. The absolute 
difference is only 0.1%.  
 
Table 18 Beneficiaries with benefit design changes in the pre- and post-intervention 
period in diabetes cohort 
Benefit designs Pre-period Post-period P-value 
Mandatory mail   
      Yes 23(0.3%) 6(0.07%) 0.0016 
      No  8,026(99.7%) 8,043(99.93%) 
Mandatory Generic  
      Yes 5(0.06%) 52(0.6%) <0.0001* 
      No  8,044(99.94%) 7,997(99.4%) 
Deductible   
      Medical & 
Pharmacy 
Deductible 
683(8.5%) 929(11.5%) <0.0001* 
      Pharmacy Only 
Deductible 
1,882(23.4%) 1,875(23.3%) 
      No deductible 5,484(68.1%) 5,245(65.2%) 
Maximum OOP 
limitation 
 
      Medical & 
Pharmacy OOP 
990(12.3%) 927(11.5%) 0.0970 
      Pharmacy Only 
OOP 
388(4.8%) 434(5.4%) 
      No OOP 6,671(82.9%) 6,688(83.1%) 
1-tier Copayment   
      Yes  6117(76.0%) 5503(68.4%) <0.0001* 
      No   1932(24.0%)  2546(31.6%) 
2-tier Copayment       
      Yes 5867(72.9%) 5620(69.8%) <0.0001* 
      No  2182(27.1 %) 2429(30.2%) 
3-tier Copayment   
      Yes 5813(72.2%) 5566(69.1%) <0.0001* 
      No  2236(27.8%) 2483(30.9%) 
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1-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 1734(21.5%) 1724(21.4%) 0.8478 
      No   6315(78.5 %)  6325(78.6 %) 
1-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 814(10.1%) 770(9.6%) 0.2443 
      No  7235(89.9%) 7279(90.4%) 
1-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 349(4.3%) 684(8.5%) <0.0001* 
      No  7700(95.7%) 7365(91.5%) 
2-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 2028(25.2%) 2117(26.3%) 0.1087 
      No  6021(74.8%) 5932(73.7%) 
2-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 1023(12.7%) 853(10.6%) <0.0001* 
      No  7026(87.3%) 7196(89.4%) 
2-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 628(7.8%) 1287(16.0%) <0.0001* 
      No  7421(92.2%) 6762(84.0%) 
3-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 2081(25.8%) 1961(24.4%) 0.0292 
      No  5968(74.2%) 6088(75.6%) 
3-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 1064(13.2%) 884(11.0%) <0.0001* 
      No  6985(86.8%) 7165(89.0%) 
3-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 659(8.2%) 1332(16.5%) <0.0001* 
      No  7,390(91.8%) 6,717(83.5%) 
  
 
Table 19 Beneficiaries with benefit design changes in the pre- and post-intervention 
period in hypertension cohort 
Benefit designs Pre-period Post-period P-value 
Mandatory mail   
      Yes  121(0.3%)  55(0.2%)  <0.0001* 
      No   36,591(99.7%)  36,657(99.8%) 
Mandatory Generic  
      Yes  38(0.1%)  265(0.7%)  <0.0001* 
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      No   36,674(99.9%)  36,447(99.3%) 
Deductible   
      Medical & 
Pharmacy 
Deductible 
 3,715(10.1%)  5,202(14.2%)  <0.0001* 
     Pharmacy Only 
Deductible 
 8,573(23.4%)  8,487(23.1%) 
      No deductible 24,424(66.5%) 23,023(62.7%) 
Maximum OOP 
limitation 
 
     Medical &  
Pharmacy OOP 
 4,585(12.5%) 5,001 (13.6%)  <0.0001* 
     Pharmacy Only       
OOP 
 1,988(5.4%)  2,157(5.9%) 
      No OOP 30,139(82.1%) 29,554(80.5%) 
1-tier Copayment   
      Yes 27900(76.0%) 25091(68.3%)  <0.0001* 
      No  8812(24.0%) 11621(31.7%) 
2-tier Copayment       
      Yes 26577(72.4%) 25317(69.0%)  <0.0001* 
      No  10135(27.6%) 11395(31.0%) 
3-tier Copayment   
      Yes 26200(71.4%) 24916(67.9%)  <0.0001* 
      No  10512(28.6%) 11796(32.1%) 
1-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 7761(21.1%) 7867(21.4%) 0.3392 
      No  28951(78.9%) 28845(78.6%) 
1-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 3119(8.5%) 2912(7.9%)  0.0054  
      No  33593(91.5%) 33800(92.1%) 
1-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 1665(4.5%) 2815(7.7%)  <0.0001* 
      No  35047(95.5%) 33897(92.3%) 
2-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 9308(25.4%) 9602(26.2%)  0.0131 
      No  27404(74.6%) 27110(73.8%) 
2-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 4149(11.3%) 3302(9.0%)  <0.0001* 
      No  32563(88.7%) 33410(91.0%) 
2-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
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      Yes 3055(8.3%) 5205(14.2%)  <0.0001* 
      No  33657(91.7%) 31507(85.8%) 
3-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 9678(26.4%) 8946(24.4%)  <0.0001* 
      No  27034(73.6%) 27766(75.6%) 
3-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 4441(12.1%) 3559(9.7%)  <0.0001* 
      No  32271(87.9%) 33153(90.3%) 
3-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 3287(8.9%) 5563(15.1%)  <0.0001* 
      No  33425(91.1%) 31149(84.9%) 
 
 
Table 20 Beneficiaries with benefit design changes in the pre- and post-intervention 
period in hyperlipidemia cohort 
Benefit designs Pre-period Post-period P-value 
Mandatory mail   
      Yes 35(0.2%) 24 (0.1%)  0.1518 
      No  20,669(99.8%) 20,680(99.9%) 
Mandatory Generic  
      Yes 18(0.1%) 145 (0.7%)  <0.0001* 
      No  20,686(99.9%) 20,559(99.3%) 
Deductible   
      Medical & 
Pharmacy 
Deductible 
2,280(11.0%) 3,096(15.0%)  <0.0001* 
      Pharmacy Only 
Deductible 
4,607(22.3%) 4,523(21.8%) 
      No deductible 13,817(66.7%) 13,085(63.2%) 
Maximum OOP 
limitation 
 
      Medical & 
Pharmacy OOP 
2,754(13.3%) 2,973(14.4%)   
 
0.0002*       Pharmacy Only 
OOP 
1,220(5.9%) 1,334 (6.4%) 
      No OOP 16,730(80.8%) 16,397(79.2%) 
1-tier Copayment   
      Yes 15528(75.0%) 14086(68.0%)  <0.0001* 
      No  5176(25.0%) 6618(32.0%) 
2-tier Copayment       
      Yes 14671(70.9%) 13970(67.5%)  <0.0001* 
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      No  6033(29.1%) 6734(32.5%) 
3-tier Copayment   
      Yes 14467(69.9%) 13749(66.4%)  <0.0001* 
      No  6237(30.1%) 6955(33.6%) 
1-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 4510(21.8%) 4590(22.2%) 0.3424 
      No  16194(78.2%) 16114(77.8%) 
1-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 1706(8.2%) 1603(7.7%) 0.0619 
      No  18998(91.8%) 19101(92.3%) 
1-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 988(4.8%) 1645(7.9%)  <0.0001* 
      No  19716(95.2%) 19059(92.1%) 
2-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 5502(26.6%) 5663(27.3%) 0.0746 
      No  15202(73.4%) 15041(72.7%) 
2-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 2360(11.4%) 1926(9.3%)  <0.0001* 
      No  18344(88.6%) 18778(90.7%) 
2-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 1883(9.1%) 3066(14.8%)  <0.0001* 
      No  18821(90.9%) 17638(85.2%) 
3-tier Coinsurance   
      Yes 5698(27.5%) 5215(25.2%)  <0.0001* 
      No  15006(72.5%) 15489(74.8%) 
3-tier Minimum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 2520(12.2%) 2073(10.0%)  <0.0001* 
      No  18184(87.8%) 18631(90.0%) 
3-tier Maximum 
Coinsurance 
 
      Yes 2017(9.7%) 3261(15.7%)  <0.0001* 
      No  18687(90.3%) 17443(84.3%) 
 
5.2.2.2 Cost sharing design changes of the experimental group 
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Table 21 summarizes beneficiaries’ cost sharing changes among the three study 
cohorts. None of the changes in cost sharing designs had significant differences at the p-
value of 0.001: 
1) 1-tier copayment: A large percent of beneficiaries (around 44%) stayed at the 
same copayment design for generic drugs. Some beneficiaries (around 31%) had an 
increase in generics copayment while a smaller amount of beneficiaries (around 25%) 
had a decrease in copayment design for generics.   
2) 2-tier copayment: More than a half of the beneficiaries (around 51%) changed 
to a design with higher copayment for preferred brand name drugs. Only a minority of the 
beneficiaries (around 7%) had a decrease in the amount of copayment. 
3) 3-tier copayment: Just as with the 2-tier copayment, a large percent of the 
beneficiaries (around 42%) changed to a design with higher copayment for non-preferred 
brand name drugs. Only a minority of the beneficiaries (around 7%) had a decrease in the 
amount of copayment. 
4) 1-tier coinsurance: A small number of beneficiaries (around 5%) underwent a 
decrease in coinsurance rate compared to those (around 4%) who underwent an increase 
in the coinsurance rate for generic drugs.  
5) 2-tier coinsurance: The number of beneficiaries with an increase in the percent 
of coinsurance was twice the number of beneficiaries with a decrease in percent of 
coinsurance of preferred brands. 
6) 3-tier coinsurance: The number of beneficiaries with an increasing copayment 
design was similar to the number of beneficiaries with a decreasing copayment design of 
non-preferred brands. 
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Table 21 Changes in cost sharing strategies in the experimental group 
Design  Diabetes 
Cohort 
 Hypertension 
Cohort 
 Hyperlipidemia 
Cohort 
P-value 
1-tier Copayment   
      Decrease 2000(24.9%) 9057(24.7%) 4888(23.6%) 0.0049 
      No changes 3525(43.8%) 16018(43.6%) 9344(45.1%) 
      Increase 2524(31.3%) 11637(31.7%) 6472(31.3%) 
2-tier Copayment   
      Decrease  562(7.0%) 2665(7.3%) 1414(6.8%) 0.0781 
      No changes 3378(42.0%) 15234(41.5%) 8815(42.6%) 
      Increase 4109(51.0%) 18813(51.2%) 10475(50.6%) 
3-tier Copayment   
      Decrease 612(7.6%) 2802(7.6%) 1473(7.1%) 0.1097 
      No changes 4078(50.7%) 18662(50.8%) 10457(50.5%) 
      Increase 3359(41.7%) 15248(41.5%) 8774(42.4%) 
1-tier Coinsurance   
      Decrease 382(4.8%) 1853(5.0%) 1055(5.1%) 0.0026 
      No changes 7370(91.5%) 33289(90.7%) 18680(90.2%) 
      Increase 297(3.7%) 1570(4.3%) 969(4.7%) 
2-tier Coinsurance   
      Decrease 268(3.3%) 1342(3.7%) 777(3.8%) 0.2094 
      No changes 7241(90.0%) 32858(89.5%) 18446(89.1%) 
      Increase 540(6.7%) 2512(6.8%) 1481(7.1%) 
3-tier Coinsurance   
      Decrease 514(6.4%) 2556(7.0%) 1524(7.4%) 0.0112 
      No changes 6979(86.7%) 31503(81.8%) 17630(85.1%) 
      Increase 556(6.9%) 2653(7.2%) 1550(7.5%) 
 
5.2.3 Descriptive statistics of control variables 
 
Control variables were identified based on Andersen’s behavioral model of health 
services utilization. They were classified into three categories as described in Chapter 4 
(Methods). Age, sex, comorbidity (measured as prospective risk score), number of 
medications, pre-PDC, and pre-GDR were measured at the individual level. Race, 
	   91	  
education and income information were not available at the individual level and were 
measured using 2010 census data at the 5-digit ZIP code level reported in the member 
enrollment file.  
Tables 22, 23, and 24 show the descriptive statistics of control variables in the 
diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia cohorts, respectively. The distributions of 
control variables were similar for all three-disease cohorts.  
For all disease cohorts, age, income, and number of medications were 
significantly different (p <0.001) between the control and experimental groups. 
Beneficiaries in the control groups were slightly older than those in the experimental 
groups. These differences, while statistically significant, were judged not to be 
particularly meaningful being differences of 1 year (diabetes cohort) or less (hypertension 
and hyperlipidemia cohorts).  
Slightly more than half of the beneficiaries were female in the diabetes and 
hypertension cohorts; more than half of the beneficiaries were male in hyperlipidemia 
cohort. These differences are not statistically significant, however. 
 The zip code level data is also shown in Table 22, 23, and 24.  Using the diabetes 
cohort as an example, in the five-digit zip code areas where the study subjects in the 
control group lived, 25.2% of zip code residents who were 25 years of age or older had a 
college degree or higher; 76.2% reported their race as white; 46.8% had a median 
household income more than $50,000. Beneficiaries in the experimental group with 
diabetes may have higher incomes since in general they live in zip code areas where 
51.2% of residents had a median household income more than $50,000. 
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The variable “number of medications” measured the number of unique 
medications taken by each beneficiary during the pre-period. A large percent of 
beneficiaries (around 40%) took six to ten unique medications. On average, beneficiaries 
in the diabetes cohort took more unique prescription drugs during the pre-period (see 
Table 25). 
There were not significant differences in pre-PDC and pre-GDR between the 
control group and experimental group for any disease cohort. A large percent of 
beneficiaries (more than 60%) had high medication adherence in the pre-intervention 
period among all three cohorts. Except for the hypertension cohort, less than half of the 
beneficiaries had a high percentage of generic use. 
 
Table 22 Descriptive statistics of control variables in diabetes cohort 
Control Variables Control group Experimental group P-value 
Age, (mean ± S.D.) 51.8±11.1 50.8±10.6 <0.0001* 
Sex, n (%)  
      Female 12,325(51.0%) 4,108(51.0%) 1.000 
      Male 11,822(49.0%) 3,941(49.0%) 
Race (% White),  
(mean ± S.D.) 
76.2±21.0% 75.9±18.8% 0.9604 
Education (% 
Bachelor’s Degree or 
above),  
(mean ± S.D.) 
25.2±14.7% 26.8±15.0% 0.7965 
Median income, n 
(%) 
 
      $0 - $50,000  12,845(53.2%) 3,926(48.8%) <0.0001* 
      > $50,000 11,302(46.8%) 4,123(51.2%) 
Comorbidity 
(Prospective Risk 
Score), 
(mean ± S.D.) 
4.5±3.0 4.5±2.9 0.9953 
Number of 
medications,  
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n (%) 
      1-5 5,991(24.8%) 1,829(22.7%) <0.0001* 
      6-10 10,124 (41.9 %) 3,343(41.5%) 
      11-15 5,261 (21.8%) 1,840(22.9%) 
      >=16 2,771(11.5%) 1,035(12.9%) 
Pre-GDR, 
(mean ± S.D.) 
71.7±22.8% 70.8±22.8% 0.2447 
Pre-PDC, 
(mean ± S.D.) 
80.6±20.4% 80.3±20.6% 0.9573 
Pre-PDC >= 80%, 
n(%) 
12,115 (64.3%) 4,046(64.3%)  0.9742 
 
 
Table 23 Descriptive statistics of control variables in hypertension cohort 
Control Variables Control group Experimental group P-value  
Age, (mean ± S.D.)  51.7±11.1  50.5±10.6 <0.0001* 
Sex, n (%)  
      Female 57795(52.5%) 19265(52.5%) 1.000 
      Male 52341(47.5%) 17447(47.5%) 
Race (% White),  
(mean ± S.D.) 
 78.3±20.2%  77.8±18.4% 0.9319 
Education (% 
Bachelor’s Degree or 
above),  
(mean ± S.D.) 
 27.4±15.9%  29.0±16.0% 0.8015 
Median income, n 
(%) 
 
      $0 - $50,000  54181(50.9%) 16716(45.5%) <0.0001* 
      > $50,000 52341(49.1%) 19996(54.5%) 
Comorbidity 
(Prospective Risk 
Score), 
(mean ± S.D.) 
 3.3±2.9  3.3±3.0 0.5517 
Number of 
medications 
 
      1-5 45475(41.3%) 14804(40.3%) <0.0001* 
      6-10 40536(36.8%) 13564(37.0%) 
      11-15 16565(15.0%) 5582(15.2%) 
      >=16 7560(6.9%) 2754(7.5%) 
Pre-GDR, 
(mean ± S.D.) 
77.0±24.4% 76.4±24.6% 0.9201 
Pre-PDC, 
(mean ± S.D.) 
84.7±18.5% 84.3±18.8% 0.9377 
Pre-PDC >= 80%, 66,742 (73.7%) 21,877(72.9%)  0.8579 
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n(%) 
 
 
Table 24 Descriptive statistics of control variables in hyperlipidemia cohort 
Control Variables Control group Experimental group P-value 
Age, (mean ± S.D.)  54.1±9.4  53.2±9.0 <0.0001* 
Sex, n (%)  
      Female 26090(42.0%) 8737(42.2%) 0.6229 
      Male 36022(58.0%) 11967(57.8%) 
Race (% White),  
(mean ± S.D.) 
 79.7±18.5%  79.1±17.0% 0.9165 
Education (% 
Bachelor’s Degree or 
above),  
(mean ± S.D.) 
 28.9±16.7%  30.5±16.7% 0.8044 
Median income, n 
(%) 
 
      $0 - $50,000  28559(46.0%) 8611(41.6%) <0.0001* 
      > $50,000 33553(54.0%) 12093(58.4%) 
Comorbidity 
(Prospective Risk 
Score), 
(mean ± S.D.) 
 3.7±2.8  3.7±2.8 0.4006 
Number of 
medications 
 
      1-5 25080(40.4%) 8156(39.4%) 0.0012 
      6-10 23219(37.4%) 7695(37.2%) 
      11-15 9391(15.1%) 3239(15.7%) 
      >=16 4422(7.1%) 1610(7.8%) 
Pre-GDR, 
(mean ± S.D.) 
70.1±26.9% 69.7±26.7% 0.9508 
Pre-PDC, 
(mean ± S.D.) 
80.6±19.0% 80.5±19.2% 0.9857 
Pre-PDC >= 80%, 
n(%) 
31,277 (65.1%) 10,443(65.1%)  0.9535 
 
 
Table 25 Descriptive characteristics of number of medications among the three-
disease cohorts 
 
Number of 
medications 
Diabetes Hypertension Hyperlipidemia 
Control   Exper Control   Exper Control   Exper 
Mean ± S.D.  9.5±5.2  9.9±5.2  7.7±4.9  7.8±5.0  7.7±4.9  7.8±5.0 
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5.3 Preliminary analysis of PDC and GDR 
 
 A preliminary analysis was conducted to determine the general relationship 
between pre- and post-PDC and pre- and post-GDR. Experimental and control within 
group differences were tested for each disease cohort.  
The results of the Z-tests show a general pattern that is similar across disease 
cohorts. Mean pre-PDC is significantly higher than post-PDC, and mean pre-GDR is 
significantly lower than post-GDR for both control and experimental groups (see Table 
26). 
  
Table 26 Results of Z-test 
Tests Diabetes  Hypertension Hyperlipidemia 
 Control Exper Control Exper Control Exper 
Z-test (post-PDC – pre-PDC) 
      Mean -1.16% -1.47% -0.39% -0.43% -1.05% -1.00% 
      P-value <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* 
Z-test (post-GDR – pre-GDR) 
      Mean 3.53% 4.49% 3.43% 3.89% 6.69% 7.03% 
      P-value <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* <0.0001* 
 
Minimum   1  1  1  1  1  1 
25% 
Quartile  
 6  6  4  4  4  4 
Median   9  9  7  7  7  7 
75% 
Quartile  
 12  13  10  10  10  10 
Maximum   138  57  89  45  138  57 
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5.4 Results of regression analyses 
 
For these analyses, the dependent variables are PDC and GDR in the post-
intervention period. Results from two regression analysis methods are presented. For 
general linear models, post-PDC and post-GDR are analyzed as continuous variables. For 
logistic regression models, PDC is categorized as a dichotomous variable (i.e., 
1:PDC>=80%, 0:PDC<80). A model was constructed for each dependent variable for 
each disease cohort. For the analysis of PDC, some beneficiaries were excluded because 
PDC values of 0 were found after the establishment of the contract renewal date. 
The regression analyses were completed in two steps. In the first step, the impact 
of any benefit plan changes on PDC and GDR were estimated—a total of 6 models for 
PDC and 3 models for GDR. In the second step, the impacts of the cost sharing strategies 
of copayment and coinsurance specifically were estimated in the experimental group—a 
total of 6 models for PDC and 3 models for GDR as well. 
Each model included the same set of predictor variables—the predictor variable 
of primary interest being group (experimental or control) in step 1. In step 2, the variable 
of primary interest was cost sharing strategies in the experimental group. Other variables 
believed to have an influence on PDC and/or GDR were identified from literature or 
based on availability in the claims files and included in the models. The one exception 
was the non-inclusion of “number of medications” in the GDR models. This was because 
the total number of prescription claims is also the denominator of the outcome variable 
GDR. 
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5.4.1 Step1—Regression analyses in the comparison groups 
5.4.1.1 Medication adherence 
 
Table 27 summarizes the results from general linear regression (GLM) and 
multiple logistic regressions. The results of general linear regressions and multiple 
logistic regressions share similarity in all three-disease cohorts.  
 
1) PDC in Diabetes  
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the mean of post-PDC between the control group 
and the experimental group is not significantly different from 0 (PE=0.002; p=0.3506). 
PDC in the post-period was not significantly different between beneficiaries in the 
control group (no benefit changes at contract renewal) and those in the experimental 
group (having at least one change in benefit design at contract renewal). The conclusion 
is that benefit design changes were not significantly associated with adherence to anti-
diabetes agents. 
Logistic regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing 
characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors, the odds of being adherent in the 
post period is not significantly different between the control group and the experimental 
group (OR=1.041; p =0.2572). ) PDC in the post-period was not significantly different 
between beneficiaries in the control group (no benefit changes at contract renewal) and 
those in the experimental group (having at least one change in benefit design at contract 
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renewal). The conclusion is that benefit design changes were not significantly associated 
with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-PDC, age, sex, race, and number of 
unique medications. After controlling for other factors, post-PDC will increase by 0.575 
(p<0.001) for every unit increase in pre-PDC; post-PDC will increase by 0.002(p<0.001) 
for every one-year increase of age; post-PDC will increase by 0.02(p<0.001) for male 
beneficiaries; post-PDC will increase by 0.044 (p<0.001) for every unit increase in the 
percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code 
area; compared to beneficiaries who took the number of unique medications above 15, 
beneficiaries who took the number of unique medications between 1 to 5 medications in 
pre-period will increase post-PDC by 0.001 (p<0.001); beneficiaries who took the 
number of unique medications between 6 to 10 medications in pre-period will increase 
post-PDC by 0.002 (p<0.001). 
Other significant variables in logistic regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-PDC, age, sex, race, and number of 
unique medications. After controlling for all other factors, beneficiaries who were 
adherent to medications in the pre-intervention period will increase the odds of adherence 
in the post-intervention period by 780% (OR=8.8, 95% CI=[8.281, 9.351], p<0.001) 
compared to beneficiaries who were not adherent in pre-intervention period; the odds of 
adherence will increase by 2.8% (OR=1.028, 95%CI=[1.025, 1.031], p<0.001) with a 
one-year increase of age and by 79.2% (OR=1.792, 95%CI=[1.546, 2.077], p<0.001) 
with every unit increase in the percentage of population reporting white only in the 
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beneficiary’s five-digit zip code area. Male beneficiary will increase the odds of 
adherence by 28.3% (OR=1.283, 95%CI=[1.207, 1.364], p<0.001). The larger number of 
unique medications (>15 medications) taken in the pre-intervention period was associated 
with increased medication adherence in the post-intervention period (p<0.001). If every 
thing else is held constant, compared to beneficiaries who took the number of unique 
medications above 15, beneficiaries who took the number of unique medications under 6 
(1-5 medications in pre-period) the odds of adherence will decrease by 24.8%((1-
0.752)*100%); beneficiaries who took the number of unique medications between 6 to 
10, the odds of adherence will decrease by 8.6%((1-0.914)*100%); beneficiaries who 
took the number of unique medications between 11 to 15, the odds of adherence will 
decrease by 3.1%((1-0.969)*100%). 
 
2) PDC in hypertension 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the mean of post-PDC between the control group 
and the experimental group is not significantly different from 0 (PE=0; p=0.958). PDC in 
the post-period was not significantly different between beneficiaries in the control group 
(no benefit changes at contract renewal) and those in the experimental group (having at 
least one change in benefit design at contract renewal). The conclusion is that benefit 
design changes were not significantly associated with adherence to anti-hypertension 
agents. 
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Logistic regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing 
characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors, the odds of being adherent in the 
post period is not significantly different between the control group and the experimental 
group (OR=1.001; p =0.967). PDC in the post-period was not significantly different 
between beneficiaries in the control group (no benefit changes at contract renewal) and 
those in the experimental group (having at least one change in benefit design at contract 
renewal). The conclusion is that benefit design changes were not significantly associated 
with adherence to anti-hypertension agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-PDC, age, sex, race, and prospective 
risk scores. After controlling for other factors, post-PDC will increase by 0.572 (p<0.001) 
for every unit increase in pre-PDC; post-PDC will increase by 0.002(p<0.001) for every 
one-year increase of age; post-PDC will increase by 0.006(p<0.001) for male 
beneficiaries; post-PDC will increase by 0.038 (p<0.001) for every unit increase in the 
percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code 
area; post-PDC will increase by 0.002 for every unit increase in prospective risk score. 
Other significant variables in logistic regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-PDC, age, sex, race, and prospective 
risk scores. After controlling for other factors, beneficiaries who were adherent to 
medications in the pre-intervention period will increase the odds of adherence in the post-
intervention period by 998% (OR=10.98, 95% CI=[10.66, 11.33]) compared to 
beneficiaries who were not adherent in pre-intervention period; the odds of adherence 
will increase by 2.9% (OR=1.029, 95%CI=[1.028, 1.031] p<0.001) with a one-year 
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increase of age, and by 83.5% (OR=1.835, 95%CI=[1.703, 1.978] p<0.001) with 1% 
increase in the percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-
digit zip code area. Male beneficiary will increase the odds of adherence by 11.4% 
(OR=1.114, 95%CI=[1.081, 1.149]). The odds of adherence will increase by 2.8% 
(OR=1.028, 95%CI=[1.021, 1.035]) with a unit increase in Prospective Risk Score.  
 
3) PDC in hyperlipidemia 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the mean of post-PDC between the control group 
and the experimental group is not significantly different from 0 (PE=-0.001; p=0.355). 
PDC in the post-period was not significantly different between beneficiaries in the 
control group (no benefit changes at contract renewal) and those in the experimental 
group (having at least one change in benefit design at contract renewal). The conclusion 
is that benefit design changes were not significantly associated with adherence to anti-
hyperlipidemia agents. 
Logistic regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing 
characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors, the odds of being adherent in the 
post period is not significantly different between the control group and the experimental 
group (OR=0.992; p =0.702). PDC in the post-period was not significantly different 
between beneficiaries in the control group (no benefit changes at contract renewal) and 
those in the experimental group (having at least one change in benefit design at contract 
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renewal). The conclusion is that benefit design changes were not significantly associated 
with adherence to anti-hyperlipidemia agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-PDC, age, sex, education level, income, 
and race. After controlling for other factors, post-PDC will increase by 0.550 (p<0.001) 
for every unit increase in pre-PDC; post-PDC will increase by 0.002(p<0.001) for every 
one-year increase of age; post-PDC will increase by 0.010(p<0.001) for male 
beneficiaries; post-PDC will increase by 0.028 (p<0.001) for every unit increase in the 
percentage of population graduated from college or above in the beneficiary’s five zip 
code area; post-PDC will increase by 0.054 (p<0.001) for every unit increase in the 
percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code 
area. 
Other significant variables in logistic regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-PDC, age, sex, education level, income, 
and race. After controlling for other factors, beneficiaries who were adherent to 
medications in the pre-intervention period will increase the odds of adherence in the post-
intervention period by 709.4% (OR=8. 094, 95% CI=[7.797, 8.402]) compared to 
beneficiaries who were not adherent in pre-intervention period; the odds of adherence 
will increase by 2.5% (OR=1.025, 95%CI=[1.022, 1.027] p<0.001) with a one-year 
increase of age, and by 117.3% (OR=2.173, 95%CI=[1.957, 2.414] p<0.001) with 1% 
increase in the percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-
digit zip code area. Male beneficiary will increase the odds of adherence by 14.5% 
(OR=1.145, 95%CI=[1.102, 1.189]). The odds of adherence will increase by 7.6% 
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(OR=1.076, 95%CI=[1.029, 1.125]) if beneficiaries live in an area with median 
household income above $50,000.   
 
Table 27 Results of regression analyses for PDC in step 1 
Variables  General linear regression Multiple Logistic Regression 
PE# 95% CI P-value OR 95% CI P-value 
Diabetes 1,2 
Benefit Change: 
Control vs. 
Experimental 
0.002 0.003 0.008 0.3506 1.041 0.971 1.116 0.2572 
Pre-PDC 0.575 0.563 0.585 <0.001* 8.800 8.281 9.351 <0.001* 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 <0.001* 1.028 1.025 1.031 <0.001* 
Prospective Risk 
Score 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.3739 0.998 0.985 1.011 0.7930 
Male vs. Female 0.020 0.015 0.024 <0.001* 1.283 1.207 1.364 <0.001* 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree 
0.016 
-0.001 0.034 0.0674 1.353 1.060 1.726 0.0152 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 
-0.001 
-0.006 0.004 0.6859 1.005 0.934 1.080 0.9027 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.044 0.033 0.055 <0.001* 1.792 1.546 2.077 <0.001* 
1-5 medications in 
pre-period  
vs. >15 
medications -0.010 -0.019 -.001 0.0021 0.752 0.662 0.854 <0.001* 
6-10 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.001 -0.007 0.009 <0.001* 0.914 0.817 1.021 <0.001* 
11-15 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.002 -0.006 0.010 <0.001* 0.969 0.866 1.084 <0.001* 
Hypertension3,4 
Benefit Change: 
Control vs. 
Experimental 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.958 1.001 0.967 1.036 0.967 
Pre-PDC 0.572 0.567 0.577 <0.001* 10.98 10.66 11.33 <0.001* 
Age  0.002 0.002 0.002 <0.001* 1.029 1.028 1.031 <0.001* 
Prospective Risk 
Score 0.002 0.002 0.002 <0.001* 1.028 1.021 1.035 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female 0.006 0.005 0.008 <0.001* 1.114 1.081 1.149 <0.001* 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree 0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.209 1.115 0.995 1.249 0.062 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.082 1.027 0.990 1.065 0.154 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.038 0.033 0.042 <0.001* 1.835 1.703 1.978 <0.001* 
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1-5 medications in 
pre-period  
vs. >15 
medications 0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.471 1.005 0.934 1.081 0.129 
6-10 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.007 1.063 0.992 1.139 0.019 
11-15 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.022 1.050 0.977 1.128 0.245 
Hyperlipidemia 5,6 
Benefit Change: 
Control vs. 
Experimental -0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.355 0.992 0.950 1.035 0.702 
Pre-PDC 0.550 0.543 0.557 <0.001* 8.094 7.797 8.402 <0.001* 
Age  0.002 0.002 0.002 <0.001* 1.025 1.022 1.027 <0.001* 
Prospective Risk 
Score 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.558 0.998 0.989 1.006 0.563 
Male vs. Female 0.010 0.007 0.013 <0.001* 1.145 1.102 1.189 <0.001* 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree 0.028 0.019 0.037 <0.001* 1.400 1.228 1.596 <0.001* 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.001* 1.076 1.029 1.125 0.001* 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.054 0.046 0.061 <0.001* 2.173 1.957 2.414 <0.001* 
1-5 medications in 
pre-period  
vs. >15 
medications 0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.875 0.985 0.901 1.076 0.244 
6-10 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.002 -0.004 0.008 0.491 1.013 0.933 1.101 0.732 
11-15 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.277 1.033 0.948 1.125 0.238 
# PE=Parameter Estimate 
*Denotes being statistically significant. 
1.  χ2(11)=1185.98,p-value<0.0001, R2 =0.3306  
2. LR χ2(11)=6947, p-value<0.0001, Pseudo R2 =0.3426 
3.  χ2(11)=24042.3,p-value<0.0001, R2 =0.3432 
4. LR χ2(11)=11866.56,p-value<0.0001, Pseudo R2 =0.3375 
5. χ2(11)=2410.85,p-value<0.0001, R2 =0.2935 
6. LR χ2(11)=31692.95,p-value<0.0001, Pseudo R2 =0.2914 
 
4) Summary 
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The findings among all the models regarding the association between benefit 
design changes and PDC are consistent. All models indicated no significant association 
between adherence and benefit design changes.  
 Four control variables are significant across all three-disease cohorts including 
pre-PDC, age, sex, and race. Number of unique medications taken is only associated with 
medication adherence to anti-diabetes agents; prospective risk score is only associated 
with adherence to anti-hypertension agents; Median household income and percent of 
population graduated from college or above in the beneficiary’s zip code area are only 
associated with anti-hyperlipidemia agents. 
 
5.4.1.2 Generic utilization  
 
Table 28 summarizes the results from general linear regression (GLM) of generic 
dispensing rate in the post period. The results of GLM indicate similarity in all three-
disease cohorts.  
 
1) GDR in diabetes 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the coefficient of benefit changes for generic 
dispensing rate is -0.007 (p=0.0002), suggests that with all other variables held constant, 
mean post-GDR in the control group was 0.007 lower than the experimental group. 
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Benefit design changes are significantly associated with an increase in generic utilization 
of anti-diabetes agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-GDR and prospective risk score. After 
controlling for other factors, for every unit increase in pre-GDR, post-GDR will increase 
by 0.684 (p<0.001); for every unit increase in Prospective Risk Score, generic dispensing 
rate in the post period will decrease by 0.004(p<0.001).     
 
2) GDR in hypertension 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the coefficient of benefit change for generic 
dispensing rate is -0.004 (p<0.001), suggests that with all other variables held constant, 
mean post-GDR in the control group is 0.004 lower than the experimental group. Benefit 
design changes are significantly associated with an increase in generic utilization of anti-
diabetes agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-GDR, age, education, income, and 
prospective risk score. After controlling for other factors, for every unit increase in pre-
GDR, post-GDR will increase by 0.700 (p<0.001); when age of the beneficiary increases 
by one year, post-GDR will increase but with limited amount (close to 0, p<0.001); for 
every unit increase in Prospective Risk Score, generic dispensing rate in the post period 
will decrease by 0.003(p<0.001); beneficiaries with median household income equal to or 
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higher than 50,000 dollars in the individual’s zip code area will increase post-GDR by 
0.005 (p<0.001). 
 
3) GDR in hyperlipidemia 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the coefficient of benefit change for generic 
dispensing rate is -0.003 (p=0.028), suggests that with all other variables held constant, 
mean post-GDR in the control group is 0.003 lower, but not significant, than the 
experimental group.  
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-GDR, age, race, income, and 
prospective risk score. After controlling for other factors, for every unit increase in pre-
GDR, post-GDR will increase by 0.638 (p<0.001); when age of the beneficiary increases 
by one year, post-GDR will increase by 0.001 (p<0.001); for every unit increase in 
Prospective Risk Score, generic dispensing rate in the post period will decrease by 
0.005(p<0.001); beneficiaries with median household income equal to or higher than 
50,000 dollars in the individual’s zip code area will increase post-GDR by 0.006 
(p<0.001) compared to beneficiaries with median household income lower than 50,000 
dollars in the individual’s zip code area; for every unit increase in the percentage of 
population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code area, post-GDR 
will increase 0.014 (p<0.001). 
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Table 28 Results of regression models of GDR in step 1 
Variables Parameter Estimates 95% Confidence Intervals p-value 
Diabetes1 
Control vs. 
Experimental -0.007 -0.011 -0.003 0.0002* 
Pre-GDR 0.684 0.677 0.692 <0.001* 
Age  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Prospective Risk 
Score -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female -0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.656 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree -0.013 -0.027 0.0001 0.005 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.328 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.004 -0.005 0.012 0.430 
Hypertension 2 
Benefit Change: 
Control vs. 
Experimental -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 <0.001* 
Pre-GDR 0.700 0.697 0.703 <0.001* 
Age  0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001* 
Prospective Risk 
Score -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.857 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree -0.015 -0.021 -0.009 <0.001* 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.005 0.004 0.007 <0.001* 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.002 
Hyperlipidemia3 
Benefit Change: 
Control vs. 
Experimental -0.003 -0.006 0.000 0.028 
Pre-GDR 0.638 0.634 0.642 <0.001* 
Age  0.001 0.000 0.001 <0.001* 
Prospective Risk 
Score -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.092 
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% of pop. With >= 
college degree -0.002 -0.010 0.007 0.664 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.006 0.003 0.009 <0.001* 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.014 0.007 0.021 <0.001* 
 *Denotes being statistically significant. 
1. χ2(8)=,p-value<0.0001, R2 =0.5226  
2. χ2(8)=,p-value<0.0001, R2 =0.5737 
3. χ2(8)=,p-value<0.0001, R2 =0.5054 
 
4) Summary 
 
The findings among all the models regarding the association between benefit 
design changes and generic dispensing rate are not consistent across three diseases 
cohorts. There are significant associations between generic utilization of anti-diabetes 
and anti-hypertension agents and benefit design changes, but not a significant association 
between benefit design changes and generic utilization of anti-hyperlipidemia agents in 
the post-intervention period. 
 Two control variables are significant across all three-disease cohorts including 
pre-GDR and prospective risk score. Age is also significant across all three-disease 
cohorts at the level of 0.005. Percentage of population graduated from college or above in 
the zip code area is only significantly associated with generic use of anti-hypertension 
agents. Median household income is associated with generic use of anti-hypertension and 
anti-hyperlipidemia agents. Percentage of self reported white only in the zip code area is 
only associated with generic use of anti-hyperlipidemia agents. Sex is the only variable 
that is not significantly associated with any use of generic drug. 
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5.4.2 Step 2—Results of regression in the experimental group 
 
The dependent variables are PDC and GDR (proportion outcome) in the post-
intervention period of the experimental group for general linear models, categorized PDC 
of the experimental group (i.e., 1:PDC>=80%, 0:PDC<80%) in the post period for 
multiple logistic regressions. An independent model was constructed for each dependent 
variable. Each model included the same set of independent variables and control 
variables, except that control variable “number of medications” was dropped when 
predicting GDR. Beneficiaries with a pre-PDC or post-PDC equaled 0 were excluded 
from the model. 
   
5.4.2.1 Medication adherence 
 
Table 29 summarizes the results from general linear regression (GLM) and 
multiple logistic regressions in the experimental group. The results of general linear 
regressions and multiple logistic regressions share similarity in all three-disease cohorts.  
 
1) PDC in diabetes 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, none of the cost sharing parameters is significant. 
Post-GDR is not significantly different between beneficiaries with one of the cost-sharing 
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strategies increase (or decrease) and beneficiaries with no changes in that cost sharing 
strategies. The conclusion is that changes of cost sharing strategies are not significantly 
associated with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. 
Logistic regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing 
characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors, none of the cost sharing parameters 
is significant. Post-GDR is not significantly different between beneficiaries with one of 
the cost-sharing strategies increase (or decrease) and beneficiaries with no changes in that 
cost sharing strategies. The conclusion is that changes of cost sharing strategies are not 
significantly associated with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: three control variables are 
significant in both models in predicting adherence, including pre-PDC, race, and age.  
After controlling for other factors, post-PDC will increase by 0.577 (p<0.001) for every 
unit increase in pre-PDC; post-PDC will increase by 0.003(p<0.001) for every one-year 
increase of age; post-PDC will increase by 0.043 (p=0.001) for every unit increase in the 
percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code 
area. 
Other significant variables in logistic regression: two control variables are 
significant in both models in predicting adherence, including pre-PDC and age. After 
controlling for other factors, beneficiaries who are adherent to medications in the pre-
intervention period will increase the odds of adherence in the post-intervention period by 
795.4% (OR=8.954, 95% CI=[7.923, 10.120]) compared to beneficiaries who are not 
adherent in pre-intervention period; the odds of adherence will increase by 3.1% 
(OR=1.031, 95%CI=[1.025, 1.038], p<0.001) with a one-year increase of age. 
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2) PDC in hypertension 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, none of the cost sharing parameters is significant. 
Post-GDR is not significantly different between beneficiaries with one of the cost-sharing 
strategies increase (or decrease) and beneficiaries with no changes in that cost sharing 
strategies. The conclusion is that changes of cost sharing strategies are not significantly 
associated with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. 
Logistic regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing 
characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors, none of the cost sharing parameters 
is significant. Post-GDR is not significantly different between beneficiaries with one of 
the cost-sharing strategies increase (or decrease) and beneficiaries with no changes in that 
cost sharing strategies. The conclusion is that changes of cost sharing strategies are not 
significantly associated with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: four control variables are 
significant in both models in predicting adherence, including pre-PDC, prospective risk 
score, race, and age. After controlling for other factors, post-PDC will increase by 0.566 
(p<0.001) for every unit increase in pre-PDC; post-PDC will increase by 0.002(p<0.001) 
for every one-year increase of age; post-PDC will increase by 0.003 (p<0.001) for every 
unit increase in prospective risk score; post-PDC will increase by 0.030 (p<0.001) for 
every unit increase in the percentage of population reporting white only in the 
beneficiary’s five-digit zip code area. 
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Other significant variables in logistic regression: four control variables are 
significant in both models in predicting adherence, including pre-PDC, prospective risk 
score, race, and age. After controlling for other factors, beneficiaries who are adherent to 
medications in the pre-intervention period will increase the odds of adherence in the post-
intervention period by 949.0% (OR=10.49, 95% CI=[9.867, 11.15] p<0.001) compared to 
beneficiaries who are not adherent in pre-intervention period; the odds of adherence will 
increase by 3.0% (OR=1.030, 95%CI=[1.027, 1.034], p<0.001) with a one-year increase 
of age; by 83.6% (OR=1.836, 95%CI=[1.559, 2.161] p<0.001) with one unit increase in 
the percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code 
area; by 3.9% (OR=1.039, 95%CI=[1.025, 1.053] p<0.001) with an unit increase in 
Prospective Risk Score. 
 
3) PDC in Hyperlipidemia 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, none of the cost sharing parameters is significant. 
Post-GDR is not significantly different between beneficiaries with one of the cost-sharing 
strategies increase (or decrease) and beneficiaries with no changes in that cost sharing 
strategies. The conclusion is that changes of cost sharing strategies are not significantly 
associated with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. However, the coefficient of the 1-tier 
copayment increase (copayment for generic drugs) is 0.012 (p=0.002) indicated a 0.012 
higher, but not significant, in the mean of post-PDC between beneficiaries with 
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copayment decrease and beneficiaries with no changes in copayment of generics when 
controlling for other factors.  
Logistic regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing 
characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors, none of the cost sharing parameters 
is significant. Post-GDR is not significantly different between beneficiaries with one of 
the cost-sharing strategies increase (or decrease) and beneficiaries with no changes in that 
cost sharing strategies. The conclusion is that changes of cost sharing strategies are not 
significantly associated with adherence to anti-diabetes agents. 
Other significant variables in linear regression: four control variables are 
significant in both models in predicting adherence, including pre-PDC, sex, race, and age. 
After controlling for other factors, post-PDC will increase by 0.548 (p<0.001) for every 
unit increase in pre-PDC; post-PDC will increase by 0.002(p<0.001) for every one-year 
increase of age; post-PDC will increase by 0.014(p<0.001) male beneficiaries; post-PDC 
will increase by 0.038 for every unit increase in the percentage of population graduated 
from college or higher degree; post-PDC will increase by 0.046 (p<0.001) for every unit 
increase in the percentage of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-
digit zip code area. 
Other significant variables in logistic regression: four control variables are 
significant in both models in predicting adherence, including pre-PDC, sex, race, and age. 
After controlling for other factors, beneficiaries who are adherent to medications in the 
pre-intervention period will increase the odds of adherence in the post-intervention period 
by 728.8.0% (OR=8.288, 95% CI=[7.686, 8.936] p<0.001) compared to beneficiaries 
who are not adherent in pre-intervention period; the odds of adherence will increase by 
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2.6% (OR=1.026, 95%CI=[1.022, 1.031], p<0.001) with a one-year increase of age; by 
104.9% (OR=2.049, 95%CI=[1.629, 2.578] p<0.001) with 1% increase in the percentage 
of population reporting white only in the beneficiary’s five-digit zip code area; by 22.8% 
(OR=1.228, 95%CI=[1.137, 1.327], p<0.001) with male beneficiaries.  
 
Table 29 Results of regression models of PDC in step 2 
Variables  General linear regression Multiple Logistic Regression 
PE# 95% CI P-
value 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% CI P-
value 
Diabetes 1,2 
Pre-PDC 
0.577 0.555 0.600 
<0.001
* 8.954 7.923 10.12 
<0.001
* 
Age  
0.003 0.002 0.003 
<0.001
* 1.031 1.025 1.038 
<0.001
* 
Prospective Risk 
Score 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.067 1.016 0.989 1.044 0.252 
Male vs. Female 0.010 0.001 0.020 0.024 1.182 1.045 1.338 0.008 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree 0.018 -0.017 0.053 0.313 1.268 0.785 2.050 0.332 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 -0.003 -0.014 0.008 0.640 0.948 0.817 1.100 0.481 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.043 0.018 0.067 0.001* 1.674 1.206 2.325 0.002 
1-5 medications in 
pre-period vs. >15 
medications 0.014 -0.004 0.033 0.130 0.922 0.716 1.188 0.094 
6-10 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.018 0.002 0.034 0.028 1.049 0.844 1.303 0.720 
11-15 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.020 0.005 0.036 0.011 1.166 0.939 1.448 0.030 
1-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.008 -0.004 0.020 0.201 1.027 0.873 1.209 0.724 
1-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.002 -0.010 0.014 0.763 1.000 0.845 1.183 0.862 
1-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.006 -0.035 0.046 0.782 1.164 0.671 2.017 0.992 
1-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.018 -0.018 0.055 0.327 1.348 0.827 2.196 0.288 
2-tier copayment -0.008 -0.054 0.038 0.735 0.704 0.371 1.334 0.220 
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decrease vs. no 
changes 
2-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.005 -0.010 0.019 0.517 1.102 0.907 1.339 0.138 
2-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes -0.052 -0.101 -0.002 0.042 0.608 0.310 1.190 0.115 
2-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.054 -0.067 0.175 0.384 2.036 0.304 13.62 0.314 
3-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.002 -0.042 0.046 0.926 1.227 0.663 2.271 0.414 
3-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.004 -0.017 0.008 0.505 0.901 0.757 1.072 0.238 
3-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.029 0.003 0.054 0.030 1.207 0.842 1.730 0.197 
3-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.062 -0.180 0.056 0.304 0.412 0.064 2.638 0.298 
Hypertension 3,4 
Pre-PDC 
0.566 0.556 0.575 
<0.001
* 10.49 9.867 11.15 
<0.001
* 
Age  
0.002 0.002 0.002 
<0.001
* 1.030 1.027 1.034 
<0.001
* 
Prospective Risk 
Score 0.003 0.002 0.003 
<0.001
* 1.039 1.025 1.053 
<0.001
* 
Male vs. Female 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.057 1.076 1.012 1.144 0.019 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree 0.019 0.005 0.032 0.007 1.164 0.928 1.460 0.190 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.306 1.019 0.946 1.097 0.623 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.030 0.019 0.040 
<0.001
* 1.836 1.559 2.161 
<0.001
* 
1-5 medications in 
pre-period vs. >15 
medications 0.004 -0.004 0.012 0.357 1.168 1.013 1.346 0.176 
6-10 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.006 -0.002 0.014 0.147 1.162 1.017 1.328 0.166 
11-15 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.005 -0.003 0.013 0.205 1.157 1.007 1.328 0.333 
1-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.006 0.001 0.011 0.020 1.100 1.014 1.194 0.351 
1-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.006 0.001 0.011 0.013 1.128 1.038 1.225 0.059 
1-tier coinsurance 0.004 -0.011 0.019 0.584 1.128 0.873 1.458 0.789 
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decrease vs. no 
changes 
1-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.004 -0.010 0.018 0.564 1.200 0.948 1.517 0.229 
2-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.014 -0.005 0.032 0.144 1.222 0.893 1.673 0.139 
2-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.006 -0.012 -0.001 0.031 0.932 0.848 1.024 0.057 
2-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes -0.018 -0.036 0.000 0.052 0.771 0.571 1.041 0.044 
2-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.046 0.008 0.083 0.017 1.325 0.701 2.505 0.196 
3-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes -0.005 -0.023 0.013 0.602 0.971 0.713 1.323 0.772 
3-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.149 1.034 0.951 1.124 0.584 
3-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.005 -0.005 0.015 0.336 1.012 0.856 1.196 0.369 
3-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.042 -0.078 -0.006 0.022 0.754 0.409 1.393 0.355 
Hyperlipidemia 5,6 
Pre-PDC 
0.548 0.534 0.562 
<0.001
* 8.288 7.686 8.936 
<0.001
* 
Age  
0.002 0.002 0.002 
<0.001
* 1.026 1.022 1.031 
<0.001
* 
Prospective Risk 
Score 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.504 0.996 0.980 1.013 0.671 
Male vs. Female 
0.014 0.009 0.020 
<0.001
* 1.228 1.137 1.327 
<0.001
* 
% of pop. With >= 
college degree 0.038 0.019 0.056 
<0.001
* 1.622 1.244 2.116 
<0.001
* 
Income >=$50,000 
vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.003 -0.004 0.010 0.398 1.088 0.991 1.194 0.077 
% of pop. Self-
reporting White 0.046 0.029 0.063 
<0.001
* 2.049 1.629 2.578 
<0.001
* 
1-5 medications in 
pre-period vs. >15 
medications 0.007 -0.005 0.020 0.256 0.958 0.803 1.143 0.331 
6-10 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.005 -0.007 0.016 0.422 0.971 0.824 1.143 0.450 
11-15 medications 
in pre-period vs. 
>15 medications 0.010 -0.002 0.022 0.113 1.056 0.893 1.249 0.152 
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1-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.012 0.004 0.019 0.002 1.120 1.010 1.242 0.150 
1-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.009 0.002 0.016 0.017 1.092 0.987 1.207 0.509 
1-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.007 -0.016 0.029 0.549 1.070 0.780 1.467 0.991 
1-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.013 -0.007 0.033 0.214 1.147 0.862 1.527 0.383 
2-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes -0.028 -0.054 -0.002 0.034 0.826 0.575 1.187 0.320 
2-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.004 -0.012 0.005 0.384 0.986 0.878 1.106 0.443 
2-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes -0.023 -0.049 0.003 0.086 0.880 0.609 1.271 0.185 
2-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes 0.008 -0.049 0.065 0.784 1.509 0.672 3.391 0.242 
3-tier copayment 
decrease vs. no 
changes 0.025 -0.001 0.051 0.060 1.262 0.878 1.815 0.153 
3-tier copayment 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.004 -0.011 0.004 0.351 0.938 0.845 1.041 0.082 
3-tier coinsurance 
decrease vs. no 
changes -0.001 -0.015 0.013 0.921 0.954 0.784 1.161 0.211 
3-tier coinsurance 
increase 
vs. no changes -0.025 -0.080 0.030 0.376 0.530 0.242 1.158 0.125 
#PE=parameter estimate 
*Denotes being statistically significant. 
1. χ2(22 )=,p-value<0.0001, R2 = 0. 3490 
2. LR χ2(22 )=,p-value<0.0001, Pseudo R2 = 0.3370 
3.  χ2(22 )=,p-value<0.0001, R2 = 0. 3436 
4. LR χ2(22 )=,p-value<0.0001, Pseudo R2 = 0.3335 
5.  χ2(22 )=,p-value<0.0001, R2 = 0. 2979 
6. LR χ2(22 )=,p-value<0.0001, Pseudo R2 = 0.2985 
 
4) Summary 
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The findings among all the models regarding the association between cost sharing 
strategy changes and medication adherence are consistent across all three cohorts. They 
all indicated no significant association between adherence and cost sharing changes 
within experimental group.  
 Three control variables are significant across all three-disease cohorts including 
pre-PDC, age, and race. Prospective risk score is only associated with adherence to anti-
hypertension agents; Sex and percentage of population graduated from college or above 
in the zip code area are only associated with anti-hyperlipidemia agents. 
 
5.4.2.2 Generic utilization  
 
Table 30 summarizes the results from general linear regression (GLM) of generic 
dispensing rate in the post period in the experimental group. The results of GLM indicate 
similarity in all three-disease cohorts.  
 
1) GDR in diabetes 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the coefficient of 1-tier copayment change for 
generic dispensing rate is -0.017 (p<0.001), suggests that mean post-GDR for 
beneficiaries with 1-tier decrease is 0.017 lower than beneficiaries without 1-tier 
copayment changes. The result indicates that a decrease in generic copayment does not 
necessarily increase generic utilization.  
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Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-GDR and prospective risk score. After 
controlling for other factors, for every unit increase in pre-GDR, post-GDR will increase 
by 0.668 (p<0.001); for every unit increase in Prospective Risk Score, generic dispensing 
rate in the post period will decrease by 0.005(p<0.001).     
 
2) GDR in hypertension 
 
Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the coefficient of 1-tier coinsurance increase is 
0.017 (p=0.006), suggests that mean post-GDR for beneficiaries with 1-tier coinsurance 
increase is 0.017 lower, but not significant, than beneficiaries without 1-tier coinsurance 
changes.  
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-GDR, age, and prospective risk score. 
After controlling for other factors, for every unit increase in pre-GDR, post-GDR will 
increase by 0.687 (p<0.001); when age of the beneficiary increases by one year, post-
GDR will increase but with limited amount (close to 0, p<0.001); for every unit increase 
in prospective risk score, generic dispensing rate in the post period will decrease by 
0.003(p<0.001). 
 
3) GDR in hyperlipidemia 
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Linear regression: after controlling for beneficiaries’ predisposing characteristics, 
enabling resources, and need factors, the coefficient of 1-tier copayment decrease for 
generic dispensing rate is -0.009 (p=0.006), suggests that mean post-GDR for 
beneficiaries with 1-tier decrease is 0.009 lower, but not significant, than beneficiaries 
without 1-tier copayment changes. The result indicates that a decrease in generic 
copayment does not necessary increase generic utilization.  
Other significant variables in linear regression: There are other variables 
significant in predicting adherence including pre-GDR, age, and prospective risk score. 
After controlling for other factors, for every unit increase in pre-GDR, post-GDR will 
increase by 0.625 (p<0.001); when age of the beneficiary increases by one year, post-
GDR will increase but with limited amount (close to 0, p<0.001); for every unit increase 
in prospective risk score, generic dispensing rate in the post period will decrease by 
0.006(p<0.0001). 
 
Table 30 Results of regression models of GDR in step 2 
Variables  Parameter 
Estimates 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
P-value 
Diabetes 1 
Pre-GDR 0.668 0.653 0.683 <0.001* 
Age  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 
Prospective Risk Score -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female -0.008 -0.015 -0.002 0.014 
% of pop. With >= college degree 0.006 -0.020 0.032 0.652 
Income >=$50,000 vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.000 -0.008 0.008 0.955 
% of pop. Self-reporting White 0.008 -0.010 0.027 0.375 
1-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes -0.017 -0.026 -0.008 <0.001* 
1-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes -0.006 -0.015 0.003 0.184 
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1-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes -0.022 -0.053 0.009 0.167 
1-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes 0.015 -0.012 0.042 0.281 
2-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes 0.021 -0.015 0.057 0.250 
2-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes 0.002 -0.009 0.012 0.776 
2-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes 0.045 0.007 0.083 0.021 
2-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes -0.066 -0.155 0.023 0.144 
3-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes -0.020 -0.055 0.015 0.271 
3-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes -0.002 -0.012 0.007 0.606 
3-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes -0.019 -0.039 0.001 0.068 
3-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes 0.069 -0.017 0.155 0.115 
Hypertension 2 
Pre-GDR 0.687 0.681 0.694 <0.001* 
Age  0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001* 
Prospective Risk Score -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.101 
% of pop. With >= college degree -0.016 -0.028 -0.005 0.006 
Income < $50,000  
vs. Income >=$50,000 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.312 
% of pop. Self-reporting White 0.005 -0.004 0.014 0.295 
1-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes -0.003 -0.007 0.001 0.172 
1-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.604 
1-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes 0.000 -0.014 0.013 0.943 
1-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes 0.017 0.005 0.029 0.006 
2-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes -0.005 -0.021 0.011 0.531 
2-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.164 
2-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes 0.011 -0.004 0.027 0.157 
2-tier coinsurance increase -0.011 -0.041 0.020 0.492 
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vs. no changes 
3-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes 0.013 -0.003 0.028 0.105 
3-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes -0.002 -0.006 0.002 0.406 
3-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes -0.004 -0.013 0.005 0.379 
3-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes 0.008 -0.021 0.037 0.592 
Hyperlipidemia 3 
Pre-GDR 0.625 0.616 0.634 <0.001* 
Age  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001* 
Prospective Risk Score -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 <0.001* 
Male vs. Female -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.541 
% of pop. With >= college degree 0.000 -0.017 0.016 0.970 
Income >=$50,000 vs.  
Income < $50,000 0.002 -0.004 0.008 0.446 
% of pop. Self-reporting White -0.001 -0.015 0.013 0.908 
1-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes -0.009 -0.016 -0.003 0.006 
1-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes -0.002 -0.008 0.005 0.596 
1-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes -0.010 -0.030 0.010 0.339 
1-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes 0.014 -0.004 0.031 0.124 
2-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes -0.018 -0.042 0.005 0.130 
2-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes 0.002 -0.005 0.010 0.544 
2-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes 0.027 0.003 0.050 0.025 
2-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes 0.045 -0.002 0.091 0.059 
3-tier copayment decrease vs. no 
changes 0.021 -0.002 0.045 0.072 
3-tier copayment increase 
vs. no changes -0.003 -0.010 0.003 0.306 
3-tier coinsurance decrease vs. no 
changes -0.008 -0.021 0.005 0.206 
3-tier coinsurance increase 
vs. no changes -0.034 -0.078 0.011 0.136 
*Denotes being statistically significant. 
1. χ2(19 )=,p-value<0.0001, R2 = 0 .5179 
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2. χ2(19 )=,p-value<0.0001, R2 = 0.5668 
3. χ2(19 )=,p-value<0.0001, R2 = 0.4979  
 
4) Summary 
  
The findings among all the models regarding the association between cost sharing 
strategies and generic utilization are not consistent across three diseases cohorts. There 
are significant associations between generic utilization of anti-diabetes and 1-tier 
copayment increase, but not significant findings in the other cohorts. The finding from 
diabetes cohort indicates that a decrease in generic copayment does not necessary 
increase generic utilization. 
 Two control variables are significant across all three-disease cohorts including 
pre-GDR and prospective risk score. Age is significant in the hypertension and 
hyperlipidemia cohorts.  
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
 
This study adopted a pre- and post-quasi experimental design with control group, 
and used claims data from a large PBM company located in Minnesota. There were two 
objectives for this study. The first was to investigate the impact of any pharmacy benefit 
design changes on adherence with chronic medications. The second objective was to 
examine the impact of any pharmacy benefit design changes on generic utilization. The 
two objectives were examined in three disease cohorts: diabetes, hypertension and 
hyperlipidemia. To understand the impact comprehensively, pharmacy benefit design 
changes were examined in two steps: (1) step 1—Any changes in pharmacy benefit 
design, including changes in copayment, coinsurance, deductibles, maximum out-of-
pocket limitations, maximum coinsurance amount, minimum coinsurance amount; (2) 
step 2—Changes in two cost sharing strategies (an increase or decrease in copayment and 
coinsurance) only.  
The two objectives represent two important underlying concepts in the 
management of pharmacy services. On one hand, adherence is a patient-oriented outcome 
and an important element in medication management, particularly when the drug therapy 
is directed at chronic diseases like diabetes, hypertension and hyperlipidemia. The 
importance has been emphasized in the Centers for Disease Prevention and Management 
(CMS) Star Ratings. On the other hand, generic drug utilization, as measured by GDR, is 
an important formulary management metric. The use of generic medications represents an 
important and useful strategy in reducing overall pharmacy costs for managed care 
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organizations. Responsible benefit management balances the need for plan cost savings 
with patient management.  
Medication adherence was measured in proportion of days covered (PDC) by at 
least one medication used to treat the target disease. PDC was also dichotomized as 
PDC>=80% and PDC<80%. Generic utilization was measured as the generic dispensing 
rate (GDR) for all medications the individual took during the study period (i.e., the 12 
month period of time following the estimated contract renewal).  
Two statistical models were fit in accordance with the two outcome measures: (1) 
General linear regression model for the continuously measured variables of PDC and 
GDR; and (2) Logistic regression for PDC measured as a dichotomous variable 
(1=adherence: PDC>=80%; 0=non-adherence: PDC<80%). The control variables were 
classified into three categories based on Andersen’s behavioral model of health services 
use: predisposing characteristics, enabling resources, and need factors. These control 
variables included beneficiaries’ demographic and socioeconomic information, 
medication conditions, and a proxy health risk estimate using Prospective Risk Score.  
In this chapter, the first section summarizes and discusses the study findings. The 
second section discusses the strengths of the study. The third section presents additional 
limitations of the study beyond those identified in Chapter 1 (Introduction) as inherent in 
the use of claims data. The fourth section discusses the implications of the study. Finally, 
the fifth section provides recommendations for future research. 
 
6.1 Summary of study results 
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The study sample was made up of 445,983 patients, of whom 45,850 were 
identified with benefit changes and 400,133 were identified with no benefit changes at 
contract renewal.  
Over 60% of the beneficiaries in 12-month measurements were classified as 
adherent (PDC>=80%). The mean post-PDC and post-GDR for each group within each 
cohort are shown in Table 31. Mean PDC and GDR in the post period varied across the 
three disease cohorts. PDC and GDR in the hypertension cohort were generally higher 
than those in the diabetes and hyperlipidemia cohorts. The diabetes and hyperlipidemia 
cohort had similar PDC and GDR. In addition, to understand the preliminary relationship 
between pre- and post-PDC and pre- and post-GDR, Z-tests were conducted and showed 
that mean pre-PDC was significantly higher than post-PDC, and mean pre-GDR was 
significantly lower than post-GDR across both groups in all three study cohorts.  
 
Table 31 Mean PDC and GDR in each disease cohort 
 
To understand the influence of benefit design changes on medication adherence 
and generic utilization, two-step statistical analyses were completed.  
 
1) Step one 
 
Outcome Diabetes Hypertension Hyperlipidemia 
Control   Exper Control   Exper Control   Exper 
Post-PDC 
Mean ± S.D. 
79.4±21.7% 78.8±22.1% 84.3±19.4% 83.8±19.5% 79.6±20.3% 79.5±20.4% 
Post-GDR 
Mean ± S.D. 
75.1±21.8% 75.1±21.5% 80.2±22.8% 80.1±22.8% 76.7±24.3% 76.7±23.9% 
	   128	  
Step one examined whether or not any benefit design changes at contract renewal 
resulted in changes in PDC or GDR. The findings among all the models regarding the 
associations between the benefit design changes that occurred and PDC were consistent. 
All models indicated no significant associations between adherence and benefit design 
changes.  
There were, however, significant associations between GDR and benefit design 
changes in the diabetes and hypertension cohort. The experimental group had 
0.007(p=0.0002) higher post-GDR compared to the control group in the diabetes cohort; 
beneficiaries in the experimental group had 0.004 (p<0.001) higher post-GDR compared 
to the control group in the hypertension cohort. The different findings among the three 
study cohorts could be driven by different levels of elasticity. Elasticity for primarily 
chronic symptomatic treatments could be lower than those for primarily acute 
symptomatic treatments(Landsman et al., 2005). Therefore, beneficiaries may have been 
less sensitive to copayment changes among treatments that are perceived as less urgent 
conditions such as hyperlipidemia, which until a crisis episode may not be “visible” to 
beneficiaries.  
There were some slight differences in results between linear models and logistic 
models attributable, in part, to two underlying requirements of logistic regression. First, 
logistic regression has a log transformation of the outcome variable. Second, logistic 
regression requires a categorical variable; therefore, PDC was dichotomized at 80% as 
the measure of adherence, as is commonly done when studying PDC. It is important to 
note, however, that although this is the common practice, there is little clinical evidence 
to support that PDC>=80% is clinically important. 
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2) Step two 
 
Statistical analysis in step two examined the influence of cost sharing changes on 
post-PDC and post-GDR of which two components were studied, tiered copayment and 
coinsurance designs. This selection was based on two reasons. First, these cost sharing 
strategies are the most common prescription benefit designs. Second, cost sharing has the 
most visibility to beneficiaries, since at the time of acquiring a prescription, a beneficiary 
faces an immediate financial responsibility—they must either pay the calculated amount 
of their coinsurance rate (a percentage of the total amount of the prescription charge) or 
pay the copayment amount of the tier to which the specific drug dispensed is assigned in 
the formulary.  
In the analysis of step two, neither cost-sharing strategy had a significant impact 
on PDC. This finding is consistent with a few previously published studies. Motheral et al 
found no differences in continuation rates when copayment increased in both 
hypertension cohort and hyperlipidemia cohort(B. Motheral & Fairman, 2001). Nair et al 
found no significance increase in formulary compliance rate among beneficiaries who 
stayed in the same tier design but experienced some benefit changes (i.e., 2-tier to 
another 2-tier or 3-tier to another 3-tier structure). Huskamp et al found a switch from 
brands to generics when a more aggressive copayment design was implemented, but not 
to stop taking a giving classes of medications altogether(Huskamp et al., 2003). Fariman 
et al found chronic medication therapy continuation rates did not differ significantly at 
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any other time point for anti-hypertension, or anti-hyperlipidemia agents when plan 
design changed from 2-tier to 3-tier.  
There are two possible reasons for the study’s finding that changes in the studied 
cost-sharing strategies did not impact PDC. Firstly, the copayment differences between 
pre and post period were not large. The average copayment changes were within $10; the 
average coinsurance changes were also smaller than 10% as shown in tables 12-15. It 
may take a larger copayment differential to affect medication adherence. The second 
reason of non-significance may be related to the social economic status of the study 
sample. Tamblyn et al found that increased cost sharing for prescription drugs in elderly 
persons and welfare recipients was followed by reductions in use of essential drugs and a 
higher rate of serious adverse events associated with these reductions(Tamblyn et al., 
2001). Stuart and Zacker also found that even modest copayment requirements could 
reduce the likelihood that Medicaid recipients filled any prescriptions(Stuart & Zacker, 
1999). Unlike those studies, this study included beneficiaries who were commercially 
insured employees with possible higher income level and health status. Thus, the findings 
could be different. 
Studies that have reported associations between cost sharing and adherence 
(usually reporting on non-adherence) were also generally studies of individuals newly 
initiating on prescription medications(Gleason, Starner, Gunderson, Schafer, & Sarran, 
2009). Goldman et al found that doubling co-payments was associated with reductions in 
the use of eight therapeutic classes, but patients diagnosed as having a chronic illness and 
receiving ongoing care were less responsive to copayment changes(Goldman et al., 
2004). In contrast to studies of individuals newly initiated on medications, this study 
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included individuals established on prescription medications for the treatment of chronic 
illnesses. Beneficiaries who initiated therapy in the post period (the 12-months following 
the estimated contract renewal date) were excluded. The differences found between 
adherence and the effect of cost sharing when taking into account the time of initiation of 
prescription drug therapy is important. Underlying cost sharing strategies may be less 
influential on decision making once beneficiaries have initiated therapy. 
Results from the second dependent variable, generic dispensing rate, also showed 
no significance with most of the cost sharing strategies. One exception was noted in the 
diabetes cohort.  For beneficiaries with a decrease in the amount of copayment for Tier 1 
(generic products) the mean post-GDR was 0.017 (p=0.0003) lower than beneficiaries 
without copayment changes in the diabetes cohort; changes in post-GDR were not 
significant in the hypertension and hyperlipidemia cohorts.. The inconsistency of this 
finding can also be found in literature. A review of published literature would indicate 
that a reduction in generic cost sharing should motivate beneficiaries to use generics 
(Clark et al., 2014). While a majority of studies reported in literature have demonstrated 
that a higher generic cost sharing was associated with lower generic use (Roebuck & 
Liberman, 2009; Tang et al., 2014; Zimmerman, 2012). There are also studies that have 
reported an increase in GDR with or without benefit changes.  Nair et al found an 
increase in GDR by 6—8% with or without benefit changes(K. V. Nair, RJ., 2004) and 
Landsman et al found different generic use rates among different therapeutic classes 
when benefit changes(Goldman et al., 2004).  
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Overall, this study found that mean post-PDC was lower than pre-PDC, a 
suggestion that adherence generally decreased over the time period identified for this 
study (1/1/2011 to 6/30/2013), while GDR generally increased over the same time period, 
The regression results suggest, however, that the benefit design changes that occurred for 
beneficiaries during this time period did not appear to have a significant influence on 
adherence as measured by PDC, but were associated with an increase in generic 
utilization using GDR as the metric.   
Non-adherence with chronic therapy has serious clinical implications, such as 
reduced control over disease parameters, increased risk of disease sequelae, and impaired 
quality of life. The decrease in PDC over time identified in the preliminary analysis needs 
to be carefully monitored in the future, particularly given the strong emphasis being 
placed on adherence in these three therapeutic groups in the CMS Star Ratings.  
 
The finding is, therefore, relatively important. The decrease in PDC is not 
associated with benefit design changes, while the increase in GDR is associated with 
benefit design changes within the studied pharmacy benefit designs.  
 
While this study did not find significant associations between benefit design 
changes and PDC or between the specific cost sharing strategies of copayment and 
coinsurance and PDC or GDR, there were other variables that were significant in 
predicting post-PDC and post-GDR (see Table 28). It was anticipated that both post-PDC 
and post-GDR would be significantly associated with pre-PDC and pre-GDR, 
respectively and statistical analysis supported this relationship. In general, prior 
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adherence is significantly associated with future adherence and the use of generic 
medications is significantly associated with the future use of generically equivalent 
medications.  
Age and race were consistently associated with post-PDC in step one and step two 
across all three-disease cohorts. Older beneficiaries and a higher percentage of self-
reported white beneficiaries appear to have significantly higher post-PDC controlling for 
other factors. Findings in the literature are consistent with the findings in this study. 
Couto, et al found younger age beneficiaries, lower income beneficiaries, and females 
were less adherent to chronic medications for hypertension, diabetes, and 
hyperlipidemia(Couto et al., 2014). Benner et al. demonstrated that black and other 
nonwhite races were less adherent to statin therapy(Benner et al., 2002). This study’s 
findings regarding the influence of race, income, education on medication adherence and 
generic utilization should be interpreted cautiously since the inclusion of these measures 
were based on the percentage of the population in a five-digit zip code area, taken from 
the 2010 US census. These measurements are subject to error, as they do not reflect the 
actual individual information. 
The association between demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and 
GDR is not commonly found in literature. Nair et al, as one of the only studies to report 
on this relationship, found that the GDR for women was 6.2% greater than men(K. V. 
Nair et al., 2003). This study, in contrast, did not find a significant association between 
sex and GDR. Prospective Risk Score, however, was inversely associated with GDR in 
most of the models’ findings, meaning that as risk score increases, GDR decreases.  
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The findings of these significant variables were not consistent across the study’s 
disease cohorts. Considerably more variables were found to be significantly associated 
with PDC or GDR in the hypertension cohort. One possible explanation is a 
methodological one—the hypertension cohort had a substantially larger sample size. 
Other explanations may be found in the large body of literature reporting on the 
contribution of sociodemographic factors to differences (literature frequently uses the 
term disparities) in many aspects of health care including access to prescription drugs, 
use of generic medications and adherence to prescribed therapies.  
 
Table 32 Other significant variables in predicting post-PDC and post-GDR 
Disease 
cohorts 
Step1: PDC Step2: PDC Step1: GDR Step2: GDR 
Variables P-
value 
Variables P-
value 
Variables P-
value 
Variables P-
value 
Diabetes Pre-PDC <0.001 Pre-PDC <0.001 Pre-GDR <0.001 Pre-GDR <0.001 
Age  <0.001 Age  <0.001       
Sex  <0.001         
Race  <0.001 Race  <0.001       
# of 
medicati
ons 
<0.001         
    Prospecti
ve risk 
score 
<0.001 Prospecti
ve risk 
score 
<0.001 
Hypertensi
on 
Pre-PDC <0.001 Pre-PDC <0.001 Pre-GDR <0.001 Pre-GDR <0.001 
Age  <0.001 Age  <0.001 Age  <0.001 Age  <0.001 
Prospecti
ve risk 
score 
<0.001 Prospecti
ve risk 
score 
<0.001 Prospecti
ve risk 
score 
<0.001 Prospecti
ve risk 
score 
<0.001 
Race  <0.001 Race  <0.001     
    Educatio
n  
<0.001   
    Income  <0.001   
Hyperlipid
emia 
Pre-PDC <0.001 Pre-PDC <0.001 Pre-GDR <0.001 Pre-GDR <0.001 
Age  <0.001 Age  <0.001 Age  <0.001 Age  0.001 
Sex  <0.001 Sex  <0.001      
Educatio
n 
<0.001 Educatio
n 
<0.001     
Income  0.001          
Race  <0.001 Race  <0.001     
      Prospecti <0.001 
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ve risk 
score 
 
 
It is important to note that the general linear models had small but fair R2 values, 
indicating that these models had explanatory power in explaining medication adherence 
and generic utilization. The R2 of the regressions were between 20% and 40%, indicating 
that the study models explain around 20-40% of the dependent variables, while the 
baseline variable (pre-PDC and pre-GDR) accounted for a relative large percentage of R2. 
A small R2 may be caused by the lack of availability of variables that have been 
identified as important in other literature—variables such as health beliefs, and attitudes 
toward the need for and use of prescription drugs. For logistic regressions, since Pseudo 
R square is inadequate to check the goodness of fit, Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-
fit tests were conducted. All models had a p-value above 0.05, indicating that the models 
built fit the set of observations. 
In the study, the significant level was adjusted from 0.05 to 0.001. As sample size 
increases, the chance of finding a significant difference will increase as well. Therefore, 
the decision was made to use a more strict decision rule to determine significance.  
 
6.2 Strength of the study 
 
This study has several strengths compared to existing studies. First of all, this 
study thoroughly examined the impact of benefit design changes on medication 
adherence and generic utilization after controlling for variables that potentially affect the 
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two outcomes as well, including demographic information, socioeconomic status, 
estimated health status, and medication history. 
Secondly, this study examined the impact of medication adherence and generic 
utilization in three disease cohorts: diabetes, hypertension and hyperlipidemia. By 
providing a more comprehensive comparison of the similarities and differences across the 
three diseases, this study has more generalizability in terms of study populations. In 
addition, this study had significantly large sample size and included commercially 
enrolled beneficiaries from more than 12 states. Compared to previous studies, our study 
is based on large samples using “real-world” pharmacy claims data. “Real-word” data has 
higher validity to be generalized to real-world clinical practice than data from clinical 
trials, patient registries, or studies initiated in clinics where individuals are monitored 
more closely. 
Thirdly, the study design was a pre- and post quasi-experimental design with 
control group. Other studies with significant findings were commonly lacked of control 
groups or adjusting baseline (pre-PDC and pre-GDR). A study design that includes a 
control group allows adjustment for baseline trends and will, therefore, more accurately 
predict the relationship between benefit design changes and medication adherence and 
generic utilization.  
 Fourthly, PDC was conducted based on disease level and allowed for 
examination of adherence to multiple concurrent medications. GDR was calculated based 
on individual level and provided a more comprehensive assessment of individuals’ 
generic drug use. Additionally, PDC was measured as both continuous variable and 
categorical variable with general linear regression and logistic regression, respectively. 
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Quantifying adherence at both continuous and categorical levels provides a possibility to 
systematically and thoroughly examined the findings and increases the accuracy of 
measure adherence. 
 
6.3 Study limitations  
 
Despite the above noted strengths of the study, there are some limitations of this 
study that need to be noted. These limitations are related to data source, study design, 
generalizability, and variable measurement.  
The data sources for this study were beneficiaries’ pharmacy claims data 
supplemented with administrative data files (including a benefit information file and a 
member information file), and 2010 census data. The original purpose of claims data 
collected by PBM is to obtain reimbursement for health services, not for health research. 
Fields related to reimbursement are generally accurate, but coding errors or inaccurate 
entries in some other fields may occur. For example, during the process of estimating 
plan change date, the study found some claims payment by beneficiaries were not 
consistent with the cost sharing design in the benefit file. The other example is the 
accuracy of the days supply used to calculate PDC. There were some claims that shared 
the same daily dosage and quantity dispensed, but had quite different records of the days 
supply. However, given the extremely large sample size, minor inaccuracy in coding may 
not make a difference in computing the results. 
Additionally, patients’ consumption compliance cannot be evaluated through 
	   138	  
claims data. Pharmacy claims represent the acquisition of a prescribed medication only. 
Claims records can only indicate beneficiaries’ medication acquisition behaviors (filling 
the prescriptions) instead of medication consumption behaviors (actually taking the 
medications). But the PDC calculated based on pharmacy record has been showed a good 
correlation with actual drug levels and has been widely used in adherence studies (Doshi 
et al., 2009; Steiner, Koepsell, Fihn, & Inui, 1988). Pharmacy claims data are also 
believed to be more objective in measuring compliance since self-reports might 
overestimate medication use (Wang et al., 2004). Additionally, pharmacy claims may not 
completely represent patients’ medication coverage. The measurements of generic drug 
utilization and medication adherence may not be accurate because some sources of 
supply are not recorded in claims, such as out-of-plan use of pharmacy services and over-
the-counter (OTC) medications. 
The three diseases cohorts included in this study were created using pharmacy 
claims only. Medical claims were not available to determine if ICD-9-CM codes 
suggesting diagnoses of diabetes, hypertension or hyperlipidemia were present. Some 
beneficiaries without hypertension disease might also fill claims for hypertension drugs 
and used them to treat other diseases. Classifying disease cohorts based solely on 
prescription claims could, therefore, overestimate the number of beneficiaries with 
hypertension .   
Another limitation is the generalizability of this study. The subjects of this study 
were employer-sponsored, commercially enrolled beneficiaries with a mean age of about 
53 years. Therefore, the results of the study may not be generalized to other settings, such 
as Medicare, Medicaid, or other public plans. Also, the setting of changes of benefit plan 
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designs was between Jan. 1, 2012 and Jun.30, 2012. The benefit design could be quite 
different at different time settings. It may not be generalizable to other years.  
The third limitation is that this study is an observational study. The internal 
validity of an observational study is always questionable. This study can only examine 
the association between pharmacy benefit design changes and generic drug utilization 
and medication adherence. Any interpretation of these findings as indicative of causality 
is inappropriate. This study primarily focuses on examining behaviors driven by the 
change of benefit design on cost sharing. Patients may choose to forgo a drug or change 
an established drug regimen for other reasons, among these are side effects, low curative 
effects, perceptions about the similarity of lower-tier substitutes and providers’ opinions 
of discontinuing or altering established drug therapies, and other changes in benefit 
designs. Above factors all provide some insights into the evaluation of generic drug 
utilization and medication adherence. Such factors are likely to influence beneficiaries’ 
treatment decisions but are difficult to capture in recorded data. Therefore, the analysis 
might be subject to unobserved confounding without measuring those factors.  
In addition, the observational period in this study is only 12 months, which may 
not be long enough to comprehensively capture the beneficiaries’ behavior changes in 
response to benefit design changes. The study found that decrease copayment of generic 
drugs did not necessary increase the generic dispending rate. It is possible that 
beneficiaries had not been aware of the copayment decrease or had not have the 
opportunity to fill more generic prescriptions within the study period.  
The fourth limitation is the measurement of PDC and GDR. In the study, PDC 
was computed at disease level, which makes it possible to have multiple claims at the 
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same period of time. When calculating how many days were covered by at least one drug, 
it is assumed those drug were taken concurrently. Therefore, any early fills were not 
adjusted to a new start date when prior fills ran out. As a result, it may underestimate 
adherence if these drugs were not required concurrently. GDR was measured as the total 
number of retail generic prescription claims dispensed divided by the total number of 
retail prescription claims for the beneficiary during a 12-months period of time. However, 
there are some brands that do not have generic substitutions. Without considering this 
factor, GDR might be underestimated.  
In addition, because this study excluded beneficiaries who received prescription 
drugs by mail order, both PDC and GDR were underestimated. There are also other 
sources for acquiring prescription medications, such as prescriptions paid by cash and 
free samples from physicians that were not taken into account in the claims count to 
calculate GDR and PDC in this study.  
The fifth limitation is the adoption of 2010 Census data. Socioeconomic 
information was not provided in the claims data file. Data related to income, educational 
level, and races/ethnicity were estimated from 2010 census data by ZIP code of residence. 
Because of the lack of alternatives with claims data analyses, census data were commonly 
adopted in health services research. But they might not be the ideal proxies of individual-
level information. Inference related to these three variables should be made cautiously 
when analyzing results from regression models.  
Finally, the sixth limitation is the study model. Despite the inclusion of important 
covariates and the leveraged use of census data, the potential endogeneity of pharmacy 
benefit design remains. Additionally, copayments across tiers may be correlated, thereby 
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increasing the possibility of multicollinearity in multivariate models.  
 
6.4 Implications for plan management 
 
Benefit designs that increase cost savings without consideration of patient 
outcomes and the opposite, benefit designs that increase patient outcomes without 
consideration of the implications for costs, are not desirable. The ideal—improved patient 
outcomes and decreased health care costs—may not be achievable but the potential for 
increased cost savings and neutral impact on a patient outcome like medication adherence 
may be possible.  
Many studies argue that higher cost sharing is associated with lower adherence, 
and adherence to chronic medications generally results in lower rates of office visits and 
hospitalizations; lower levels of cost sharing may thus translate to better health 
outcomes(Gibson et al., 2010). Medical plans, employers, and policy makers should 
consider implementation of interventions targeted to improve and maintain higher levels 
of medication adherence. In this study, overall the post-PDC was lower than pre-PDC 
across both the study and control groups in all three-disease cohorts studied, indicating 
that for the study time period there was an overall decrease in medication adherence. 
Study findings indicated that this reduction in PDC was not associated with the benefit 
design changes that occurred in this study population; other factors may be the reason 
that actually causes the reduction in adherence.  
The mean adherence in the post-intervention period (measured in PDC) is 79.2%, 
84.1% and 79.6% for diabetes, hypertension and hyperlipidemia, respectively. These 
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findings were based on a 12-month observation period. The mean adherence level may 
likely be lower if PDC is measured for a longer period of time. Therefore, continued 
monitoring of PDC is important, with more efforts focused on initiatives to improve 
patients’ adherence to chronic medications that take into account of elements beyond 
benefit designs. 
The study results indicated that changes in benefit design of the magnitude found 
in the study population were not significantly associated with medication adherence, but 
were significantly associated with generic utilization. This finding has several 
implications for policy-making regarding benefit designs for chronic diseases. Because of 
bioequivalence, a generic drug is much more cost-effective compared to its respective 
brand name product. Considering the burden of health care expenditures, increasing the 
generic dispensing rate is an important strategy. Among this commercially enrolled group 
of beneficiaries, the changes that occurred in the pharmacy benefit design are actually 
going in the right direction (i.e., increasing GDR)—a positive outcome for plan 
management efforts.  
It is important to note, however, that this study found no significant adverse effect 
of small benefit design changes (less than $10 for copayment and 10% for coinsurance).  
Larger benefit design changes could be detrimental. In some respects it may be better to 
improve the efficiency of health care delivery and the appropriate use of prescription 
medications rather than attempting to control drug costs through health insurance 
strategies of increasing cost-sharing to beneficiaries (Steinwachs, 2002). 
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6.5 Recommendations for future research 
  
Chronic disease, such as diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia, can 
dramatically affect beneficiary’s quality of life. Medication adherence to chronic 
medications is extremely important. Our study did not find a significant association 
between medication adherence and benefit plan changes that occurred in the contract 
renewal period for this study population. Medication adherence in the post period, 
however, decreased significantly according to the results of Z-test. Medication adherence 
may not be related to benefit changes, but due to unavailability of data, some factors such 
as beneficiaries’ social structure, health beliefs, and perceived needs were not included in 
the study. These may be important factors leading to reductions in  medication adherence 
and would contribute to a better understanding of the decrease in PDC noted. Future 
research may investigate these factors more thoroughly. It may be necessary to take a 
step back and consider whether the real problem is pharmacy benefit design.  
In addition, this study used beneficiaries’ five-digit zip code level information 
matching from 2010 census data to present individual level information including race, 
income, and education. Aggregate proxies are very likely to introduce measurement 
errors. Future studies are recommended to use actual individual level information to 
examine their effects on medication adherence.  
It was noted that there was an overall reduction in adherence during the time 
frame of this study. Because of the importance of adherence to clinical outcomes, and the 
CMS emphasis being placed on adherence for the three therapeutic disease areas included 
in this study, additional attention to this reduction is warranted. Further studies need to be 
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performed to determine the potential reasons for the reduction in adherence from 2011 to 
2012 and the potential for adherence to continue to decline.  
Beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare programs were not included in 
this study. Medicaid beneficiaries are typically financially disadvantaged and have 
different socioeconomic characteristics. Therefore, health seeking and medication 
adherence behaviors of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare could be quite 
different from commercially enrolled beneficiaries. Future research could include those 
patients and compare whether the effect of benefit design changes is different. Also, this 
study examined the impact of benefit plan changes on medication adherence and generic 
utilization in three chronic disease cohorts. Further research could examine how the 
impact of benefit changes may vary across other chronic conditions.  
 The study explored the impact of benefit design changes on adherence up to 12-
months following a change in prescription drug benefits. As discussed in the limitation 
section, a 12-month follow up time may not be long enough to detect any difference in 
adherence and generic drug use caused by benefit plan changes. A longer follow up 
period should be conducted, which may identify differences in adherence and that may be 
more reflective of the long term use of medications used in the treatment of chronic 
diseases. 
 This study examined in greater depth the two most common prescription benefit 
designs that may be targeted for annual contract changes--tiered co-payment and co-
insurance. Other design strategies, such as deductible amounts with or without 
minimum/maximum limits, also have financial implications for a beneficiary and can be 
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modified during contract renewal periods. The impact of these benefit design changes on 
PDC and GDR would be of interest.   
Additionally, regarding the measurement of PDC and GDR, a fruitful area of 
research would be to adopt multiple measurements and compare the effects to help 
develop more reliable and valid adherence measurement. For example, future research 
should consider a more specific definition of GDR—one that takes into the account of the 
availability of generic substitution when calculating GDR.  
Finally, this study did not find any significant associations between cost sharing 
strategies and adherence. One reason could be that the changes within copayment or 
coinsurance were relatively small. Future studies to determine the impact of large 
changes in cost sharing are recommended.  
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Appendix	  1	  A list of Pharmacy Risk Groups	  
 
In the table below, Array Position is the position of the PRG ID in the Risk 
Record’s PRG Array, with the first array element being number one. In any given 
Symmetry release, the order of the PRG IDs may or may not correspond with the order of 
the PRG Array positions (For example, a release may include a new ID with a low 
number positioned at the end of the array.) Combination Pharmacy Risk Markers are 
prefaced with an asterisk (*). 
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